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DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION AND THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
 
Dov Fox∗ and Christopher L. Griffin, Jr.† 
 
This Article examines the influence of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) on affective attitudes toward children with 
disabilities and on the incidence of disability-selective abortion. 
Applying regression analysis to U.S. natality data, we find that the 
birthrate of children with Down syndrome declined significantly in the 
years following the ADA’s passage. Controlling for technological, 
demographic, and cultural variables suggests that the ADA may have 
encouraged prospective parents to prevent the existence of the very class 
of people it was designed to protect. We explain this paradox by showing 
the way in which specific ADA provisions could have given rise to 
demeaning media depictions and social conditions that reinforced 
negative understandings and expectations among prospective parents 
about what it means to have a child with a disability. We discuss 
implications for antidiscrimination law and prenatal testing policy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin’s decision to give birth to a child with 
Down syndrome put prenatal testing and children with disabilities in the national 
spotlight.1 This Article examines the decision that thousands of other parents have 
made to continue a pregnancy after receiving a positive test for Down syndrome.2 
Our empirical and sociological analysis locates a likely feature of reproductive 
decision making in an unlikely place: antidiscrimination law. Specifically, we 
measure and explain what impact, if any, the Americans with Disabilities Act3 
(ADA) had on the incidence of selective abortion on the basis of Down syndrome 
in the United States from 1989 to 2002. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II draws on expressive law theory to 
explain the connection among the ADA, social attitudes toward people with 
disabilities, and the practice of disability-selective abortion. Expressive law theory 
claims that law communicates messages about social norms in addition to 
assigning penalties for noncompliance.4 Where communities are connected by 
shared cultural understandings, legal statements can change social norms in ways 
                                                 
1  Palin’s son Trig appeared on news broadcasts and the cover of People magazine. 
See PEOPLE, Cover Story: Sarah Palin’s Family Drama: The Republican VP Candidate Is 
Raising a Baby with Down Syndrome and Coping with Her Teenage Daughter’s 
Pregnancy—While Running for Office, PEOPLE, Sept. 22, 2008; see also Julie Bosman et 
al., In Palin, Families of Disabled Children See a Potential White House Friend, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, at A19 (describing how Palin could be seen on her campaign plane 
“leaning over Trig, cooing and feeding him from a bottle”); John Fritze, A Spotlight for 
Special Needs Parents Hope Palin Lifts Awareness of Down Syndrome, USA TODAY, Sept. 
8, 2008, at A6 (discussing the disability issues that parents hoped Palin would address as 
the mother of a child with Down syndrome); Jennifer Steinhauer & Amy Harmon, Parents 
of Special-Needs Children Divided over Palin’s Promise To Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2008, at A25 (reporting how “the camera panned to her baby, Trig” during an early 
campaign appearance). 
2  See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus; The 
DNA Age: In Their Shoes, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A1. 
3  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12300 (2006). 
4  See Wibren van der Burg, The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, 
Especially with Regard to Moral Issues, 20 L. & PHIL. 31, 43 (2001). 
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that are not reflected in the plain meaning of the text. These changes derive from 
the expressive effects of law. Specifically, antidiscrimination law can generate 
unexpected social costs for behavior that is completely unrelated to the law’s 
protections and regulations. We call these costs expressive externalities. 
Part III presents twin hypotheses about how the ADA’s expressive 
externalities might have impacted the incidence of Down-selective abortion. Each 
theory relies on the process by which the ADA shaped parental attitudes toward 
people with disabilities. The first hypothesis suggests that the ADA strengthened 
parents’ understandings of people with disabilities as equal members of the 
political community. On this account, the ADA—by enhancing the rights and 
opportunities of people with disabilities—made having an affected child a less 
daunting prospect. In turn, parents would have been encouraged to continue a 
pregnancy after receiving a positive test for fetal disability. The second hypothesis 
suggests a less heartening expressive function. This theory would suggest that the 
ADA triggered collateral effects that increased negative exposure to people with 
Down syndrome. Specifically, off-putting social contact with and critical media 
coverage of people with Down syndrome after the ADA’s passage could have 
convinced parents that children with disabilities were burdensome or defective. 
Part IV tests the relative strength of these hypotheses through regression 
analysis. Our empirical model suggests that the second hypothesis has greater 
relevance for Down syndrome than other prevalent conditions. The statistical 
results, which control for demographic characteristics and prenatal care histories, 
suggest that the birthrate of children with Down syndrome fell by between 13 and 
18 per 100,000 relative to the pre-ADA period of 1989–1990.5 Additional data on 
amniocentesis screenings confirm that Down syndrome birthrates declined at the 
same time that prenatal testing rates remained constant.6 In fact, more children 
with Down syndrome were born when amniocentesis screening rates dropped.7 
These findings suggest that parental choices, rather than other exogenous 
explanations, were responsible for the decline in Down syndrome births in the 
mid-1990s. 
In Part V, we consider the plausibility of these findings by examining a range 
of legal, material, economic, technological, social, familial, and medical factors 
that might reasonably have informed prenatal testing and selective abortion for 
Down syndrome. The connection between civil rights legislation and private 
decision making yields insight into the far-reaching influence of antidiscrimination 
law on remote social behaviors. Scholars and lawmakers should consider not only 
the unintended social meanings that state action can convey, but also the possible 
effects these meanings can confer on those whom the law was designed to protect.8 
                                                 
5  See infra Part IV. 
6  See infra Part IV. 
7  See infra Part IV. 
8  For a discussion on the paradoxical effects of antidiscrimination law in the context 
of employment, see Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why 
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1497–
98 (1996); Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
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The Article concludes with policy recommendations and proposals for further 
research. 
 
II.  DISABILITY RIGHTS AND EXPRESSIVE EXTERNALITIES 
 
A. The ADA and Prenatal Testing 
 
The ADA is a sweeping federal antidiscrimination law that combines some of 
the most celebrated and influential provisions of earlier civil rights legislation, 
including Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,9 several provisions of 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968,10 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.11 The goals of the 101st Congress in enacting the ADA were no less than 
revolutionary.12 The ADA affirmed the rights of people with disabilities to work,13 
seek redress for discrimination,14 and exercise the responsibilities of citizenship.15 
The law has three parts:16 Title I prohibits disability discrimination in 
employment;17 Title II guarantees access to public services;18 and Title III 
guarantees access to public accommodations19 for persons who are (or are 
perceived to be) impaired in a legally recognized way.20 
                                                                                                                            
Who Hires When It’s Hard To Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41, 42–43 (2002); Richard A. Posner, 
The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 517–19 (1987) (arguing 
that disparate-treatment liability makes employers reluctant to hire individuals from 
protected classes due to increasing costs of employing those group members). 
9  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (2006). 
10  Id. § 3601. 
11  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
12  See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 
493 (1991) (“A prominent innovative feature of the ADA is the unprecedented scope of 
activities and entities it regulates.”). 
13  See Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 
174, 176 (Leslie P. Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES].  
14  See Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National 
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 135–38 (1998). 
15  See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63–
101 (1991). 
16  For an itemized analysis and legislative history of the ADA’s various provisions, 
see generally Burgdorf, supra note 12. 
17  42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006). 
18  Id. § 12131. 
19  Id. § 12181. 
20  Individuals can qualify for protection in three ways under the ADA’s definition of 
disability. See id. § 12102(2)(A)–(C). First, a person can show evidence of a known 
physical or mental condition or impairment that “substantially limits one or more . . . major 
life activities.”  See id. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1997). Major life activities 
include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
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The ADA’s antidiscrimination record has been mixed.21 On the one hand, 
ADA specifications for mass transit have led to widespread accommodations on 
                                                                                                                            
breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). A “substantial” limitation on the 
major life activity of working prohibits the individual from performing a class of job 
activities compared with an average person with comparable skills and training. See id. § 
1630.2(j)(3)(i). The second way people can qualify for ADA protection is to “have a record 
of” such a condition.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). A record of disability means an individual 
“has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k); see also id. pt. 
1630, app. § 1630.2(k). The third way to qualify as “disabled” under the ADA is to give 
evidence of being “regarded as” having a substantially limiting condition. 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2)(C). This “regarded as” prong might include, for example, an asymptomatic 
individual who is denied an employment opportunity because of a supervisor’s or 
coworker’s negative attitudes or behavior toward that individual’s supposed psychiatric 
illness, predisposition for cancer, or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). See Abbott v. 
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We hold unhesitatingly that HIV-positive 
status, simpliciter, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, comprises a physical 
impairment under the ADA.”), rev’d on other grounds, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); see generally 
Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality? Some Reflections on the Interpretation of 
Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 345, 348 (1996) (reviewing 
perceived disability case law arising under state regulations). 
The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was signed 
into law by President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 
(2008). The impact that this Act will have on courts’ interpretation of disability under the 
ADA, as of the time of this Article’s publication, remains to be seen. But there is reason for 
optimism. The ADAA affirms that the definition of disability should be construed in favor 
of broad coverage to the extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The ADAAA retains 
the ADA’s basic definition of “disability” as an impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having 
such an impairment. Id. § 12102. But it changes the way that these statutory terms should 
be interpreted in several ways that are intended to make it easier for an individual seeking 
protection under the ADA to establish that he or she has a disability within the meaning of 
the ADA. See id. § 12101–02. 
Among the most significant changes, the ADAAA states that: an episodic impairment 
or one in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when 
active; expands the definition of “major life activities” by including a range of activities 
(e.g., walking, reading, bending, and communicating) and bodily functions (e.g., “functions 
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, 
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions”); clarifies that mitigating 
measures other than “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses” shall not be considered in 
assessing whether an individual has a disability; changes the definition of “regarded as” so 
that it no longer requires a showing that the employer perceived the individual to be 
substantially limited in a major life activity; and provides that individuals covered only 
under the “regarded as” prong are not entitled to reasonable accommodation. See id. § 
12102. 
21  See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 69–70 (2005). 
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bus, rail, and other forms of public transportation.22 Employment provisions have 
effectively eliminated disability inquiries and pre-employment physical 
examinations.23 Telecommunications mandates have resulted in the establishment 
of a nationwide relay system enabling use of telephone services by those with 
hearing or speech impairments.24 On the other hand, voluntary noncompliance and 
private discrimination remain largely unchanged.25 Scholars disagree about the 
ADA’s impact on the employment and poverty rate among individuals with 
disabilities.26 This Article departs from traditional antidiscrimination analysis by 
focusing on heretofore unexamined effects of the ADA on selective abortion of 
fetuses with Down syndrome.27 
Prenatal testing can disclose single-gene mutations associated with more than 
400 conditions.28 These conditions range from severe physical and mental 
                                                 
22  See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial 
Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination 
Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 32 (1999). 
23  Id.  
24  Id.  
25  Peter David Blank & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369 
(1997). 
26  See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment 
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 929, 
932 (2001) (concluding that employment declined among all men and women under age 
forty after the ADA became effective); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment 
Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 691, 694–95 (2000) (finding 
that male employment rates fell by 7.2 percentage points after the ADA was passed with no 
corresponding effect on wages); John J. Donohue III et al., Assessing Post-ADA 
Employment: Some Econometric Evidence and Policy Considerations (John M. Olin 
Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Research Paper No. 358), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282307 (using longitudinal data to conclude that the 
ADA had no discernible effects on either relative wages or employment levels); Christine 
Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of Disability 
Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10740, 2004) 
(presenting alternative empirical results denying a relationship between the ADA’s 
enactment and declining employment among the disabled). 
27  We discovered no previous scholarship exploring the effect of law on selective 
abortion. For empirical studies of selective abortion, see generally Allyson J. Peller et al., 
Trends in Congenital Malformations, 1974-1999: Effect of Prenatal Diagnosis and 
Elective Termination, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 957 (2004); Kenneth B. 
Schechtman et al., Decision-Making for Termination of Pregnancies with Fetal Anomalies: 
Analysis of 53,000 Pregnancies, 99 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 216 (2002). 
28  Advances in reproductive biotechnology will bring tests for many more conditions 
and will reduce the time, inconvenience, invasiveness, medical risk, and cost for pregnant 
women. Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1867, 1871 (2002). 
2009] DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION AND THE ADA 851 
 
impairments such as anencephaly29 and Tay-Sachs30 (untreatable diseases that 
result in childhood mortality), to relatively minor conditions such as color 
blindness31 or polydactyly,32 a heritable trait involving an extra finger. Some 
parents seek information about fetal disability for reassurance or to prepare for 
children with physical or mental impairments.33 However, prenatal tests are 
requested primarily to identify and abort fetuses that carry genetic mutations 
associated with disability.34 Since no cure or treatment is available for most 
anomalies identified at the prenatal stage,35 prospective parents who receive a 
positive test for fetal conditions such as spina bifida, muscular dystrophy, sickle 
cell anemia, fragile X, and Down syndrome are faced with the decision either to 
terminate the pregnancy or to bring to term a child with a known impairment.36 
Down syndrome, also called trisomy 21, is a genetic condition caused by the 
presence of an extra chromosome.37 The phenotypic characteristics associated with 
the condition include mild to severe mental retardation and distinctive physical 
features.38 
There are legal, social, and medical reasons why Down syndrome provides a 
fitting case to test the possible effects of the ADA on selective abortion. First, 
                                                 
29  See Jianmin Chen et al., Disruption of the MacMARCKS Gene Prevents Cranial 
Neural Tube Closure and Results in Anencephaly, 25 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6275 6276 
(1996). 
30  See Ivo Tews et al., Bacterial Chitobiase Structure Provides Insight into Catalytic 
Mechanism and the Basis of Tay–Sachs, 3 NATURE STRUCTURAL BIOLOGY 638, 644–46 
(1996). 
31  See Jeremy Nathans et al., Molecular Genetics of Human Visual Pigments, 26 ANN. 
REV. GENETICS 403, 407–09 (1992). 
32  See Laura A. Lettice et al., Disruption of a Long-Range Cis-acting Regulator for 
Shh Causes Preaxial Polydactyly, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7548, 7549–50 (2002). 
33  For certain genetic disorders, such as those that cause high levels of cholesterol, 
detection before birth significantly increases the promise of effective treatment and 
prevention. In rare cases, early diagnosis can preclude years of unpleasant monitoring 
procedures, such as the regular colonoscopies required for diagnoses of familial 
adenomatous polyposis, a condition that frequently remains concealed for several years. 
See Norman M. Ford, Ethical Aspects of Prenatal Screening and Diagnosis, in GENETICS 
AND ETHICS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 197, 198–200 (Gerard Magill ed., 2004) 
(describing various procedures for prenatal screening and diagnosis). 
34  See Nancy Press & C.H. Browner, Why Women Say Yes to Prenatal Diagnosis, 45 
SOC. SCI. & MED. 979, 979 (1997). 
35  In utero surgery may one day be used, albeit in an exceedingly small number of 
cases, to repair neural tube defects (myleomeningoceles). See A.J. Eggink et al., In Utero 
Repair of an Experimental Neural Tube Defect in a Chronic Sheep Model Using 
Biomatrices, 20 FETAL DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 335, 339 (2005). 
36  See, e.g., George F. Will, Golly, What Did Jon Do?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 
72. 
37  See Charles J. Epstein, Down Syndrome (Trisomy 21), in THE METABOLIC AND 
MOLECULAR BASES OF INHERITED DISEASE 749, 793 (C.R. Scriver et al. eds, 1995). 
38  Id. at 794. 
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unlike many other conditions with a significant biological etiology,39 Down 
syndrome typically counts as a disability under the ADA.40 Second, Down 
syndrome is a condition with which most people are at least somewhat familiar, in 
that they have seen a person with Down syndrome, could identify the physical 
features that typically accompany the condition, or are aware the condition is 
associated with a certain level of mental retardation.41 Down syndrome is for this 
reason exceptional among genetic disorders such as hemophilia, color blindness, or 
Klinefelter syndrome, insofar as many people will have formed, or would have 
reason to form, attitudes and opinions about the lives of people with Down 
syndrome.42  
Third, persons with Down syndrome continue to encounter prejudice and 
discrimination because of their condition. For example, the legislative history of 
the ADA recounts the case of a child with Down syndrome being banned from a 
New Jersey zoo because a zookeeper feared that her presence would frighten the 
chimpanzees.43 Finally, among all genetic anomalies, Down syndrome is the 
genetic condition that occurs most frequently within the U.S. population,44 the 
condition for which Americans test most routinely before birth,45 and the condition 
                                                 
39  Courts have denied disability status to persons with various impairments and 
conditions. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (visual 
impairment); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518 (1999) 
(hypertension); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 476 (1999) (myopia); 
Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (inability to 
drive); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 351(4th Cir. 2001) (seizure disorder); 
Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp. 2d 937, 938 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (epilepsy); Todd v. 
Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 449–50 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (epilepsy with “light” 
seizures). 
40  See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B (2008) (“It would violate this section to establish 
exclusive or segregative eligibility criteria that would . . . limit the seating of individuals 
with Down’s syndrome to only particular areas of a restaurant.”). But see Littleton v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-12770, 2007 WL 1379986, at *3–4 (11th Cir. May 11, 2007) 
(holding that individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities—what the court 
calls “mental retardation”—do not count as “disabled” for purposes of the ADA). 
41  See Deborah J. Fidler & Robert M. Hodapp, Craniofacial Maturity and Perceived 
Personality in Children with Down Syndrome, 104 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 410, 419 
(1999). 
42  C. Julian-Reynier et al., Attitudes Towards Down’s Syndrome: Follow Up of a 
Cohort of 280 Cases, 32 J. MED. GENETICS 597, 599 (1995). 
43  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990) (citing Joseph P. Shapiro, A New 
‘Common Identity’ for the Disabled, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1988, at Z18). 
44  Down syndrome occurs in 1 out of every 733 live births. National Down Syndrome 
Society, Down Syndrome Fact Sheet, http://www.ndss.org (select “About Down 
Syndrome” and “Down Syndrome Fact Sheet”) (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). More than 
400,000 people in the United States have Down syndrome. Id. 
45  See Glenn E. Palomaki et al., Maternal Serum Screening for Down Syndrome in the 
United States: A 1995 Survey, 176 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECology 1046, 1051 (1997); 
David S. Newberger, Down Syndrome: Prenatal Risk Assessment and Diagnosis, AM. 
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on the basis of which fetuses are aborted at the highest rate.46 The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) set thirty-five as the 
recommended age at or above which pregnant women should receive an 
amniocentesis because, at that age, the average woman’s chance of having a baby 
with Down syndrome equals her chance of having a miscarriage associated with 
the procedure.47 
 
B. Legal Theories of Expressivism 
 
The past decade has witnessed a renaissance in expressivist scholarship, both 
in traditional legal circles and in the law and economics community. We suggest a 
potential shortcoming in this literature—namely, a failure to appreciate the 
negative effects of law on social attitudes and practices orthogonally related to the 
law’s intended regulatory context. This subpart argues that antidiscrimination law 
exerts a more wide-ranging influence than expressivist scholars have recognized. 
We propose a broader understanding to account for these effects and introduce a 
concept called “expressive externalities,” which captures the social costs of 
behavior the law does not regulate. The concept of expressive externalities serves 
two functions in this Article. First, it informs our hypothesis about how the ADA 
influenced Down-selective abortion.48 Second, it bolsters the explanatory power of 
expressive law theory more generally. 
Following the lead of Lawrence Lessig,49 legal scholars including Cass 
Sunstein,50 Dan Kahan,51 Elizabeth Anderson,52 and Richard Pildes53 have argued 
                                                                                                                            
FAMILY PHYSICIAN, Aug. 15, 2000, available at http://www.aafp.org/afp/20000815/ 
825.html. 
46  See, e.g., Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A 
Systematic Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808, 811 (1999) (reporting UK 
abortion rates of 92 percent following a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome). 
47  See Nancy C. Rose, Maternal Serum α-Fetoprotein Screening for Chromosomal 
Abnormalities: A Prospective Study in Women Aged 35 and Older, 170 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 1073, 1078–80 (1994). 
48  See infra Part IV. 
49  See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 
947 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning] (discussing the ways in 
which “governments, as well as others, act to construct the . . . social meanings . . . that 
surround us”); see also Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2181, 2188 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms] (“[T]he 
meaning perspective adds a technique for changing the costs associated with certain 
behaviors by altering the interpretive context in which those behaviors exist.”). 
50  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2025 (1996). 
51  Under Kahan’s original discussion of expressive law, punishments themselves can 
impart social meanings beyond the expression of retribution. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, 
Alternative Sanctions] (claiming that “the signification of punishment is moral 
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that laws may have subtle yet meaningful effects on public norms and associated 
behaviors. According to an expressivist account of law, regulations can discourage 
undesirable practices in ways that transcend the expected effects of punitive 
sanctions for noncompliance.54 Laws also influence the populace by “making 
statements”55 and “moralizing”56 through language “designed to affect social 
norms and . . . ultimately to affect both judgments and behavior.”57 Expressivist 
theories assume that legal discourse takes place in settings shaped by social norms 
and cultural meanings. Without these conditions, the only “messages” 
communicated would be the rules codified in the law. However, when a new law 
interacts with existing normative frameworks, it can generate changes in social 
behavior “because either the law induces [individuals] to change their tastes . . . , 
or [because the law] creates a fear of bearing social sanctions . . . , or because of 
pressure brought to bear upon them through societal sanction.”58 The point is that 
social responses to official sanctions are informed by more than the ordinal 
relationship between pain and gain. 
The confluence of legal statements and social norms can drive a wedge 
between the intentions of lawmakers and the consequences of the laws they 
enact.59 Given shared understandings about the legal meaning within a particular 
                                                                                                                            
condemnation” and that “[b]y imposing the proper form and degree of affliction on the 
wrongdoer, society says, in effect, that the offender’s assessment of whose interests count 
is wrong”). Kahan later revised his views on the expressive functions of criminal 
punishment. See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2075, 2089 (2006) (acknowledging “mistakes about the expressive political economy 
of imprisonment”). 
52  See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–63 (2000) (claiming that 
constitutional law should account for the expressive component of state action). 
53  Id.  
54  See generally Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 35 (2002) (identifying a mechanism through which law affects norms by altering 
prior beliefs about outcomes); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive 
Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Attitudinal Theory] (attempting in 
part to explain political disputes by the effect of attitudes signaled by symbolic government 
action on behavior); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, Focal Point Theory] (showing how laws 
can generate convergence independent of formal sanctions). But cf. Matthew D. Adler, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1462–93 
(2000) (arguing that expressive accounts of law do not follow from moral theories). 
55  Sunstein, supra note 50, at 2024. 
56  Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 51, at 603. 
57  Sunstein, supra note 50, at 2025. 
58  Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law 
Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1173 (2004) (reviewing DAVID M. ENGEL & 
FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)). 
59  See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 52, at 1537–38. 
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social context, laws can convey conceptions of social status even if they do not 
explicitly target a disfavored group.60 Nor need recipients of a law’s message 
accept it as valid for the law to have expressive power.61 Under the Jim Crow 
regime, for example, racial segregation of public facilities sent a clear message that 
“blacks [were] untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from which ‘pure’ whites 
must be protected.”62 Even if a majority of the white population rejected this 
notion, collective awareness “that segregation laws express contempt for blacks” 
was sufficient to ensure “these laws constitute blacks as a . . . stigmatized caste.”63 
The historical and cultural meaning of racial segregation sent the message that 
blacks were not worthy of equal concern and respect.64  
Expressivist theories enrich our understanding of the interaction between law 
and social norms. However, expressivist scholars often fail to appreciate how law 
can transmit meanings that affect social attitudes and practices wholly unrelated to 
the law’s substantive provisions.65 Individuals often internalize messages at a 
tangent to the mandates embedded in the text.66 Such collateral effects are highly 
plausible given the complexity of modern social interaction. We draw on this 
ordinary observation to support a potentially extraordinary proposition: The 
Americans with Disabilities Act may have had a significant impact on the 
incidence of disability-selective abortion, a social practice completely beyond the 
scope of the text or legislative history. 
 
C.  Economic Theories of Expressivism 
 
Expressivist theories sometimes draw on the language of microeconomics to 
articulate the relationship between legal intervention and preference formation. If 
we think of political and social interaction among citizens as a repeated game in 
which the players choose strategies over time, then collective norms and values 
emerge when a sufficient number of players pursue the same strategies.67 However, 
                                                 
60  See id. 
61  See id. at 1528. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  The phrase “equal concern and respect” comes from RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977). 
65  See, e.g., Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 49, at 965–66, 968–71, 
1019–33 (relating the expressive effects of dueling laws and civil rights statutes in the 
American South to the expressivist effects of smoking regulation and life-threatening sex). 
66  See infra Part III.C. 
67  For an introduction to game theoretic concepts, see ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME 
THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 55–129 (1992), which covers repeated games with 
complete information and HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 512–38 (6th ed. 2003), which applies formal models to games of cooperation, 
competition, coexistence, and commitment. 
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modern advances in game theory stress that information and payoff structures can 
lead to multiple equilibria, in which case no unique convention emerges.68 
Robert Cooter has shown how law might direct preferences, payoffs, and 
behavior toward common understandings of its expressive content.69 In one of 
Cooter’s models, society achieves behavioral stability (in economic terms) when 
the relative proportions of individuals respecting norms and those flouting 
convention equalize payoffs between the two groups.70 He depicts a simple graph 
with a downward sloping payoff to “rightdoers” and “wrongdoers” as the 
percentage of wrongdoers in society increases.71 At a unique point, no individual 
can gain by altering her level of compliance; this is the economic definition of 
equilibrium. But self-enforcement mechanisms, through which individuals 
“punish” each other for deviant behavior, can raise this equilibrium payoff. Under 
conditions in which “some people respond [to a new law] by devoting more 
resources to upholding it,”72 the introduction of expressive law analysis can change 
our understanding of payoff structures and, in turn, change the incentive 
equilibrium for individual behavior. 
Patricia Funk’s recent analysis of mandatory voting laws in Switzerland is one 
of the few empirical studies of the expressive function of law.73 She identifies the 
expressive effect of a legal change by detecting a time series break, an 
unmistakable, systematic shift that differentially affected Swiss geographical 
districts.74 However, Funk studies contributions to public goods rather than 
                                                 
68  Some theorists suggest that a particular equilibrium, known as a focal point, may 
eventually dominate. For a description of how focal points provide clues for coordinating 
behavior, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–58 (1980). 
69  Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 
(1998). 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 590. 
72  Id. at 593. 
73  Patricia Funk, Is There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of 
Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135, 139 (2007) (asserting that 
her study is “one of the first empirical tests of expressive law”). 
74  Funk tests whether the “natural experiment” caused by the repeal of mandatory 
voting laws in four Swiss Cantons (districts) affected voter turnout. Id. at 138. The reported 
regression results indicate a 6 to 10 percentage point decrease in participation following 
abolition. Id. Given that the monetary penalty for noncompliance was less than one dollar, 
Funk interprets “the observed turnout drop . . . as support for a certain . . . ‘expressive 
effect of law’” because the “legal statement that citizens should vote apparently caused 
certain citizens to follow [it], most likely out of civic duty or fear of social sanctions.” Id. at 
138–39. Funk ultimately fails, however, to identify an expressive effect from the change in 
voting law. Her empirical model does not follow the convention of comparing treatment 
and control groups before and after the legal change. Instead, she only estimates whether 
Cantons with mandatory voting laws at any time had higher turnout rates than those 
without such measures. The lack of a temporal element in her model means that Cantonal 
differences could have already existed before the laws changed. If they did, then the law 
had no effect at all, much less an expressive one. 
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antidiscrimination law, which should be of equal empirical interest to expressivist 
scholars. 
 
D.  An Expressivist Account of the ADA 
 
A basic introduction to externalities is instructive for our discussion of 
expressive externalities. Economists have long recognized that private costs and 
benefits can diverge from those borne by society at-large.75 Because individuals 
often fail to account for the side effects of their activity, they externalize costs and 
benefits on other members of society. Classic examples in the marketplace are 
manufacturing waste that pollutes another’s land downstream (negative 
externality), and spillover effects from obtaining a college education (positive 
externality). This principle applies to legal activity as well; legislators may fail to 
consider the full range of behavioral influences transmitted by their statements and 
actions. 
Based on extensive interviews with parents and genetic counselors, Dorothy 
Wertz identified eight factors that determine parents’ “revealed preferences” for 
childbirth rather than disability-selective abortion: (1) guilt over rejecting a child 
with a disability; (2) the quality of life from infancy through adulthood for a child 
with a disability; (3) whether the pregnancy is “wanted,” independent of fetal 
disability; (4) optimism that children with disabilities will be cured or treated of 
the disabilities with which they are born; (5) spousal compromises; (6) financial 
constraints; (7) risk; and (8) the effect of a child with disabilities on existing 
children.76 Each of these factors could be thought of as a component in the parents’ 
“reproductive utility function,” i.e., the mental calculus that determines the relative 
appeal of terminating a pregnancy as opposed to bringing a fetus with disabilities 
to term. Certainly none would be directly influenced by the ADA’s explicit 
provisions.77 Any relationship between the law and the reproductive utility 
function would have to emerge from something like the expressivist channels 
discussed in Parts III(A) and III(B). 
Prospective parents might be aware of the ADA, for example, and internalize 
a message that is unintended by or even inimical to the law’s textual provisions. Or 
they may be unaware that an antidiscrimination law has passed, but the law’s effect 
on social expectations and interactions might manifest itself in one or more of the 
factors in the reproductive utility function. For example, when the ADA called 
national attention to the plight of people with disabilities, it may have led 
doctors—at least those engaged in genetic counseling sessions with prospective 
                                                 
75  See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 
ECONOMICA 371, 371–72 (1962); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 42–44 (1960); Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and the 
Theory of Games, 70 J. POL. ECON. 241, 241 (1962). 
76  Dorothy C. Wertz, How Parents of Affected Children View Selective Abortion, in 1 
ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 175–82 (Helen Bequaert Holmes 
ed., 1992). 
77  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12131, 12181 (2006).  
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patients—to emphasize the long-standing but newly publicized stereotypes and 
discrimination faced by people with disabilities. The resulting effect on attitudes 
about the expected quality of life for children with disabilities (Wertz’s second 
factor) might be strong enough relative to the other seven factors to persuade many 
prospective parents to terminate the pregnancy. 
Conventional expressivist accounts miss a critical element that this Article 
tries to correct. According to the traditional logic of expressivist legal theory, 
people tend to have minimal knowledge or awareness of a law’s mandates.78 A 
person might nevertheless internalize a message that is not stated in a statute’s text 
and have that message shape her norms or behavioral responses. Such awareness 
of the law, however, would be limited to those who have a stake in the law’s 
application and enforcement. In tort law, for example, an insurance company might 
transmit information to policyholders based on the company’s understanding of 
how the law shifts incentives, perhaps in ways that increase moral hazard.79 Our 
conceptual innovation here is to recognize that expressivist changes to social 
customs and attitudes can emerge without knowledge of a specific law but still 
because of the law’s existence. This scenario is most likely to occur when the 
affected social practices are completely unrelated to the substantive provisions of 
the law. 
To understand the possible mechanism at work, consider a law intended to 
“clean up” professional baseball by forbidding the use of a new performance-
enhancing drug. Reproachful congressional hearings that precede the law’s 
enactment cause fans to question the sport’s integrity. After a federal ban on the 
performance-enhancing drugs, major league ticket sales decline by 40 percent 
nationwide. Retail sales of products endorsed by high-profile athletes identified as 
drug users also fall dramatically. Without knowing more, one might suppose that 
the drop in attendance and merchandise sales was caused by an expressive effect of 
the anti-drug law. The government expressed a judgment about drug use in 
professional baseball, and the receipt of this message persuaded some fans not to 
attend professional games or buy merchandise associated with discredited athletes. 
These behavioral responses were caused not by the explicit threat of legal 
sanctions against drug use, but rather by the implicit message that baseball is a 
tainted activity. 
Now imagine that, after the drug ban’s passage and the ensuing drop in 
attendance, parents who are altogether unaware of the law begin to steer their 
children away from Little League baseball. They may interpret the declining 
attendance at professional ballparks as a social verdict that baseball is boring or 
behind the times. Within a few years, reduced youth talent prevents some 
                                                 
78  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 50, at 2026 (arguing that “people support a law . . . 
because they believe that it is intrinsically valuable for the relevant ‘statement’ to be 
made”). 
79  See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to 
Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1453 (2000) (describing moral hazard 
as a scenario in which, “if individuals are insured against a risk, they have inadequate 
incentives to take actions to avoid the risk”). 
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secondary schools from fielding baseball teams, and their districts’ athletic 
associations remove baseball from the schedule. This second scenario also fits 
within the expressivist paradigm, but a key feature differentiates the influence on 
youth sports from the decline in professional ticket and merchandise sales. The law 
was never intended to censure, regulate, or otherwise affect nonprofessional sports 
teams or athletes. Nevertheless, it is highly plausible that the professional drug ban 
is the “but-for” cause of a shift in attitudes about the sport generally and the 
accompanying decline in high school baseball. 
One way to think about these related but distinct expressivist channels is the 
difference between direct expressivism (on ticket sales) and indirect expressivism 
(on youth participation). The basis for this distinction lies in the different kinds of 
public response a new law generates. Although the ban on performance-enhancing 
drugs did not prescribe a boycott of professional baseball, the public understood 
the law as direct government censure of the sport. In the youth sports arena, 
however, waning interest was an indirect by-product of the attitudinal changes that 
the law communicated with respect to professional baseball. Parents who removed 
their children from Little League teams did so not because of their understanding 
or interpretation of the drug ban itself, but because of the law’s predictable effects 
on public views about baseball. 
When a law’s passage, enactment, and enforcement give rise to significant 
changes in social practices unrelated to the law’s mandates, the law generates what 
we call an expressive externality. Recall that the economic concept of externalities 
focuses on costs or benefits that accrue to third parties because of another agent’s 
activity (downstream pollution killing fish or improved education leading to a 
more productive workforce). Similarly, laws can “externalize” costs and benefits 
on individuals, social groups, or behavior wholly outside the law’s purview. 
Returning to our analysis of disability rights, we might identify the ADA’s 
expressive externalities on the practice of disability-selective abortion using the 
reproductive utility function. The ADA may have caused a sufficiently large 
change in the eight factors in that function to shift parental preference orderings 
between abortion and childbirth. While positive expressive externalities can 
produce interesting welfare gains, we focus on negative expressive externalities 
(hereinafter “expressive externalities”). An expressive externality of the ADA 
relevant to disability-selective abortion would exist if some side effect of the law 
led prospective parents to choose abortion more often than childbirth after a 
positive fetal diagnosis for Down syndrome.80 
 
III.  THE ADA AND DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION 
 
Part III presents competing hypotheses about expressive externalities the 
ADA could have generated with respect to the practice of disability-selective 
abortion. These hypotheses juxtapose the ADA’s exalted ideals against its often 
complicated social assimilation. The first hypothesis (the “uplifting ADA”) 
                                                 
80  See infra Part V. 
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suggests that the ADA’s affirmation of social equality and disability rights 
discouraged disability-selective abortion by tempering negative attitudes toward 
people with disabilities. According to this theory, by barring employment 
discrimination and assuring access to public services and accommodations, the 
ADA conveyed to parents the promise that prospective children with disabilities 
would lead happy and productive lives. The second hypothesis (the “disappointing 
ADA”) suggests that by increasing awareness of and exposure to people with 
disabilities, the ADA created feelings of discomfort or animus. When the ADA 
was passed, the media often reported unfavorable stories about people with 
disabilities, which might have convinced parents that children with disabilities 
would not be accepted into the world as social equals. Each hypothesis makes a 
rival claim about the expressivist effects that the ADA could have had on social 
attitudes and reproductive behavior in the 1990s. 
For any law to have a systematic expressive effect on social behavior, there 
must be some mechanism by which people internalize the law’s meaning. The 
hypotheses we present therefore suggest potential pathways through which this 
transmission could have occurred. These mechanisms do not, however, supersede 
the ADA’s function as the source of expressive content. Consider the proposition 
advanced by John Donohue and Steven Levitt in their study of abortion and crime: 
the legalization of abortion prevented potential criminals from existing and 
eventually violating the law.81 This Article connects reproduction outcomes to a 
legal change, namely the ADA’s passage and enforcement. Similarly, Donohue 
and Levitt ascribe birth outcomes and falling crime rates to a revolutionary 7-2 
Supreme Court decision that made no mention of abortion’s possible impact on 
public safety.82 The primary difference between the studies is that Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Roe was crafted to communicate an explicit constitutional 
right to private reproductive decision making, whereas, in drafting the ADA, 
lawmakers were silent on the issue of selective abortion. The link we propose 
between the ADA and disability-selective abortion follows the same basic logic as 
the proposition offered by Donohue and Levitt. Our argument, like theirs, suggests 
that legal transformations can reach social attitudes and behaviors that have no 
connection to the law’s content. 
 
A.  The “Uplifting ADA” 
 
The sweeping goals of participatory83 and distributive84 justice that the 101st 
Congress identified in enacting the ADA indicate that the law aimed to combat 
                                                 
81  See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on 
Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379, 380 (2001). 
82  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
83  See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 173 (1990) 
(defining social equality as requiring the “full participation and inclusion of everyone in a 
society’s major institutions”). The ADA facilitates participatory justice by requiring the 
redesign of practices that exclude individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) 
(2006) (stating that “[t]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are 
2009] DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION AND THE ADA 861 
 
attitudinal bias as much as it sought to eliminate physical barriers.85 Supreme Court 
jurisprudence affirms the view that implicit attitudes contribute significantly to the 
exclusion and devaluation of people with disabilities. In Alexander v. Choate, the 
Court recognized that discrimination against people with disabilities is “most often 
the product, not of invidious animus,” but rather of thoughtless or indifferent 
attitudes.86 Similarly, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Court noted 
that “society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as 
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”87 
The ADA’s emphasis on social prejudice therefore might have improved 
perceptions about people with disabilities. 
This first hypothesis suggests that positive effects on co-workers’ attitudes 
toward people with disabilities in the employment sphere could have collateral 
effects in the reproductive sphere. It might be that by prohibiting discrimination in 
the workplace, the ADA counteracted disability prejudice, which relies on the 
assumption that individuals with disabilities are less capable than able-bodied 
workers who perform similar functions.88 In their book-length study of workers 
with disabilities, David Engel and Frank Munger argue that the ADA has 
powerfully shaped attitudes about persons with disabilities.89 Engel and Munger 
provide testimonial evidence that the ADA produces discursive shifts altering both 
how individuals with disabilities think about their own capabilities and also how 
others regard them. The law does so by recasting people with disabilities as 
successful individuals who need only the opportunity to demonstrate their 
                                                                                                                            
to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals”). 
84  See Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination, and Priority, in AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 13, at 18, 25–27 (describing the responsibility-catering, 
welfarist, and prioritarian conceptions of distributive justice). The ADA facilitates 
distributive justice by mandating reasonable accommodations in employment for 
individuals with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (establishing that 
discriminatory practices include failure to provide reasonable accommodations to 
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities). 
85  See Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of 
Antidiscrimination Law, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 13, at 126, 128; 
Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference: Caring (f)or Justice for People with 
Disabilities, 10 HYPATIA 30, 47–53 (1995) (arguing that exclusion of disabled persons 
results from lack of social and political power rather than any biological inability). 
86  469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 319 (1990) (arguing that the 
meaning of disability is embedded in networks of social relationships). 
87  480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
88  See Harold E. Yuker, Variables That Influence Attitudes Toward People with 
Disabilities: Conclusions from the Data, 9 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 3, 22 (1994). 
89  DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 94–104 (2003). But see 
Stein, supra note 58, at 1167 (calling Engel and Munger’s methodology into question on 
account of narrow interview sampling and possible selection bias).  
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abilities.90 Consider Engel and Munger’s discussion of Barry Swygert, a man 
paralyzed by a spinal tumor and who relied on knowledge about ADA protections 
to reclaim his “ambitious” career plans and “reconstitute his identity” as a self-
conscious “rights-bearer.”91 
Causal mechanisms between attitudes in the employment and reproductive 
spheres might draw on three relevant psychological theories. First, intergroup 
cooperation theory92 posits that sustained contact with disabled persons in the 
workplace could reduce prejudice against others with disabilities.93 Positive 
attitudes emerge under conditions of equal social status, mutual goals, sustained 
intimate contact, and institutional support for equality.94 Second, cognitive 
dissonance theory predicts that people change their attitudes to reduce the tension 
they experience when those attitudes contradict some action.95 On this account, 
positive employment experiences among people with disabilities will cause co-
workers to match positive attitudes to achieve cognitive consistency.96 Third, self-
perception theory suggests that when people have weak or ambiguous attitudes, 
they develop stronger attitudes to match their own behavior and the circumstances 
under which it occurs.97 Self-perception theory predicts that when employment 
conditions support qualified employees with disabilities, a co-worker with weak or 
                                                 
90  ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 89, at 116–22. 
91  Id. at 98–102; cf. id. at 73–77 (describing Raymond Militello, a man with a 
learning disability who regards the ADA as giving disabled persons unjustifiable 
preferences). 
92  See, e.g., Barbara Armstrong et al., Effects of Cooperative vs. Individualist 
Learning Experiences on Interpersonal Attraction Between Learning-Disabled and 
Normal-Progress Elementary School Students, 6 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCH. 102, 110 (1981) 
(arguing that cooperative behavior positively affects children’s attitudes toward other 
children with disabilities in a school setting); John E. Rynders et al., Producing Positive 
Interaction Among Down Syndrome and Nonhandicapped Teenagers Through Cooperative 
Goal Structuring, 85 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 268, 272–73 (1980). 
93  See Robert Bogdan & Steven J. Taylor, Relationships with Severely Disabled 
People: The Social Construction of Humanness, 36 SOC. PROBS. 135, 143–46 (1989); 
Marcia D. Horne, Modifying Peer Attitudes Toward the Handicapped: Procedures and 
Research Issues, in ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 203 (Harold E. 
Yuker ed., 1988). 
94  See Harold E. Yuker, The Effects of Contact on Attitudes Toward Disabled 
Persons: Some Empirical Generalizations, in ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES, supra note 93, at 262. 
95  See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3, 18 (1957). 
96  Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a 
Group, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 177, 180–81 (1959). 
97  See Daryl J. Bem, Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive 
Dissonance Phenomena, 74 PSYCH. REV. 183, 198 (1967). 
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ambiguous attitudes toward people with disabilities will come to believe that his 
favorable behaviors reflect positive attitudes toward individuals with disabilities.98 
To the extent that prospective parents are included among employees who 
develop more positive attitudes about the capacities and opportunities of people 
with disabilities, perhaps they would be more willing to bring a child with a 
disability to term rather than seek an abortion. It could also be that, as compliance 
with the ADA became routine, non-discriminatory employment practices created a 
positive transformation in disability norms more generally. Positive attitudes 
toward people with disabilities could then have seeped into the public 
consciousness, with effects including more positive attitudes about the prospect of 
raising a child with such disabilities. We do not mean to suggest that this is a 
complete or correct story about the ADA and disability-selective abortion. We 
mention it here only as one possible theory to account for the ADA’s effect on 
social norms and practices that we discuss in the next Part. 
Indeed, social science research describes how civil rights for blacks evolved 
in informal, extralegal ways after the school desegregation mandates.99 People who 
grow up in racist cultures often absorb stereotypes that reside in their psyches and 
influence behavior in subtle but pernicious ways. Similarly, federal rights laws can 
subconsciously affect public attitudes in ways that diminish implicit biases.100 
Accordingly, scholars have argued that racial antidiscrimination law was 
accompanied by a reduction in racial prejudice.101 However, two salient 
differences emerge between the civil rights movement and the disability rights 
movement. First, each set of events generated drastically different cues for public 
observation. The 1964 Civil Rights Act “was preceded by images of courageous 
Freedom Riders, marches, bus boycotts, lynchings . . . and Martin Luther King, Jr. 
. . . delivering his ‘I Have a Dream’ speech.”102 The “disability rights movement,” 
by contrast, “[was] not powered by such compelling imagery.”103 The social 
movement preceding the enactment of the ADA had no charismatic social leader, 
and its most visible demonstration was described as “a pathetic event [where] 
crippled children and others crawl[ed] up the Capitol steps.”104 Consider, further, 
                                                 
98  See Mollie Weighner Marti & Peter David Blanck, Attitudes, Behavior, and ADA 
Title I, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES 
IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 356, 371 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000). 
99  See, e.g., Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, The Effect of Research Methodology 
on Desegregation-Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 88 AM. J. SOC. 839, 840–53 
(1983) (reviewing ninety-three research studies). 
100  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (drawing on psychological 
studies to criticize the intent requirement in antidiscrimination law). 
101  Id. at 332. 
102  Joseph P. Shapiro, Disability Rights as Civil Rights: The Struggle for Recognition, 
in THE DISABLED, THE MEDIA, AND THE INFORMATION AGE 59, 61–62 (Jack A. Nelson ed., 
1994). 
103  Id. at 62. 
104  Richard Harwood, When Readers Are Wrong, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1990, at C6. 
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that President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress—and a national 
television audience—before introducing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, calling his 
proposal a fulfillment of the Emancipation Proclamation and a matter of human 
rights.105 President Bush held a signing ceremony for the ADA on the White House 
lawn and compared the Act to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall.106 Just one year 
earlier, however, he had vetoed the bill that would eventually become the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.107 The difference between Johnson’s commitment to civil 
rights legislation and Bush’s tepid—or even contradictory—record on disability 
rights, could have contributed to different public responses. The social movement 
and executive actions that supported disability rights legislation in 1990 were far 
less emotionally resonant and politically potent than the events surrounding black 
civil rights in the mid-1960s. This is not to say that the uplifting account might not 
be correct, but only that there is reason to explore an alternative hypothesis about 
the possible effect of the ADA on selective abortion on the basis of disability, 
specifically Down syndrome. 
 
B.  The “Disappointing ADA” 
 
A less optimistic theory suggests that the ADA transmitted or reinforced 
negative expressive content about people with disabilities. We discuss two 
potential ADA-induced sources for such outcomes: 1) an increased likelihood that 
prospective parents would be exposed to the impairments of persons with 
disabilities; and 2) popular media coverage of the ADA. The “disappointing ADA” 
hypothesis supposes a strong relationship between the ADA and public attitudes 
toward individuals with disabilities. The national spotlight shone brightly on 
persons with disabilities after the law’s enactment, and the ADA required 
important changes to the workplace and public accommodations. During this time, 
able-bodied citizens might have become more aware of the disability “problem” 
through greater exposure to people with disabilities. Hanoch Livneh has identified 
six channels through which negative attitudes about disability may arise, three of 
which are particularly relevant to changes brought on by the ADA’s passage.108 
The first channel, what Livneh calls “conscious-unconscious,” includes causes that 
are fully known to the observer, or those of which he or she might be completely 
unaware.109 In this scenario, increased interaction with people with disabilities in 
                                                 
105  See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The 
American Promise (Mar. 15, 1965), available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/ 
archives.hom/speeches.hom/650315.asp. 
106  Gaylord Shaw, Knocking Down a Barrier, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1990, at 7. 
107  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1274 (1995). 
108  See Shaila Rao, Faculty Attitudes and Students with Disabilities in Higher 
Education; A Literature Review, 38 C. STUDENT J. 191, 192–93 (2004). 
109  Id. at 193. 
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the context of public transportation or the workplace may lead to overt animus or 
implicit biases. 
The second channel, “past experience-present situation,” connects early 
childhood experiences to present situations and interactions.110 If an able-bodied 
person attended school with a student in a wheelchair and observed or participated 
in the humiliation of that student, the able-bodied person might develop negative 
perceptions of persons with disabilities as an adult.  Finally, “internally originated-
externally originated” sources arise from interaction between an able-bodied 
person’s demographic or personality traits and those linked to a person with a 
disability or to the disability itself.111 This theory captures the complex ways in 
which persons without disabilities view differences in physical appearance, mental 
capacity, and economic potential as foreign to their own identity.112 Witnessing a 
colleague with disabilities use a special restroom or waiting on a bus while 
someone in a wheelchair uses an electric ramp might generate unfavorable 
perceptions about how those with disabilities cause social inconvenience or how 
they struggle to adjust to ordinary activities. These observations may not have 
occurred as publicly or frequently before the ADA’s employment 
discrimination,113 public services,114 and public accommodations115 mandates came 
into effect. 
Empirical work in psychology and education quantified the extent to which 
negative attitudes arose, especially through workplace contact. Survey data, for 
example, show that Americans consider mental retardation a less stable condition 
than depression or psychosis, where stability measures the likelihood for positive 
response to counseling and medication.116 As workplace dynamics shifted after the 
ADA’s passage, formal integration did not assure social acceptance. A 1995 study 
found that “although persons with mental retardation were accepted within the 
workplace, few were befriended outside of the work setting.”117 Thus, in direct 
contrast to the uplifting account in Part III(A), workplace interaction could have 
exacerbated already exclusionary opinions about persons with disabilities. One 
study published shortly after the ADA’s passage concluded that overt animus was 
not a necessary condition for these adverse social consequences: “[W]orkers 
without mental retardation initiated interactions with nondisabled co-workers three 
                                                 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006).  
114  Id. § 12131. 
115  Id. § 12181. 
116  See Patrick W. Corrigan et al., Stigmatizing Attributions About Mental Illness, 28 
J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 91, 98 (2000). 
117  Phyllis A. Gordon et al., Attitudes Regarding Interpersonal Relationships with 
Persons with Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, 70 J. REHABILITATION 50, 51 (2004) 
(citing Frank R. Rusch et al., Interaction of Persons with Severe Mental Retardation and 
Their Nondisabled Co-workers in Integrated Work Settings, 19 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 59 
(1995)). 
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times more often than with co-workers with mental retardation.”118 Such negative 
social views “were not necessarily derogatory but also were not those of equals.”119 
So-called “interaction strain” occurs when non-disabled individuals struggle with 
self-consciousness and appropriate reactions to persons with disabilities.120 This 
phenomenon could also have shaped negative perceptions about disability as a 
result of the ADA and thereby enhanced the perceived difficulty of raising a child 
with disabilities. 
Consider the plausible reflections of a prospective parent who has received a 
prenatal diagnosis for a genetic disability such as Down syndrome. Regardless of 
their precise origins, unfavorable cognitive associations with disability brought on 
by the ADA would very likely affect one’s forecast about life with or for a child 
with a disability. Enhanced exposure to individuals with disabilities through ADA-
related mandates and accommodations could prompt unenthusiastic attitudes 
toward people with disabilities generally, and toward the specific prospects of 
one’s own child. The diminished physical or mental capacity of a child with a 
disability could also remind a parent of his or her own mortality and that “[a]nyone 
can become a person with a disability virtually in a matter of seconds.”121 Such 
attitudes might “reflect an awareness that persons without disabilities are 
vulnerable to death, injury, and disease—a vulnerability most . . . are eager to 
forget.”122 Prospective parents who can see past the disability itself may still worry 
about external perceptions: “[W]ill [the parents] be considered second rate by 
association?”123 Parents may be more likely to terminate a pregnancy on the basis 
of disability when they fear social reproach from others who regard the choice to 
bear children with disabilities as negligent or irresponsible. Following enactment 
of the ADA, The New York Times published a story about the pregnancy of Los 
Angeles news anchor Bree Walker-Lampley, who announced on air that she had 
ectrodactyly, a hereditary condition that causes webbing of the fingers and toes.124 
The article noted that many in the public were outraged over Lampley’s decision to 
continue her pregnancy and thus risk “bringing a disabled child into the world.”125 
                                                 
118  Id. (citing B. Ferguson et al., Type and Frequency of Social Interaction Among 
Workers with and Without Mental Retardation, 97 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION 530 
(1993)). 
119  Id. 
120  See id. (citing Fred Davis, Deviance Disavowal: The Management of Strained 
Interaction by the Visibly Handicapped, 9 SOC. PROBS. 120 (1961); Joseph H. Evans, 
Changing Attitudes Towards Disabled Persons: An Experimental Study, 19 
REHABILITATION COUNSELING BULL. 572 (1976)). 
121  Jane West, The Social and Policy Context of the Act, 69 MILBANK Q. 3, 10 (1991). 
122  Id. 
123  Id. 
124  See Steven A. Holmes, Radio Talk About TV Anchor’s Disability Stirs Ire in Los 
Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1991, at B18. 
125  Id. An empirical study of attitudes toward mothers of children with Down 
syndrome sheds light on the social pressure that parents in other countries face to avoid 
having a child with Down syndrome. British researchers Theresa Marteau and Harriet 
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A crucial feature of this social interaction narrative is that prospective parents 
need not even know of the ADA’s existence for the law to affect reproductive 
decisions. This point reflects precisely where our concept of expressive 
externalities departs from the traditional theory of expressive law. According to the 
latter, individuals must recognize specific legislative provisions before they can 
ascribe expressive content to them. Expressive externalities, however, arise when 
laws generate social meaning in domains upon which the law has no bearing and 
not necessarily with awareness of the causal chain. In the pollution example,126 a 
fisherman downstream from the factory need not know the identity of the polluting 
company or that a polluting factory was constructed miles up the river. He still 
incurs the cost of contaminated water that the factory owner externalized. In our 
baseball hypothetical, parents who removed their children from youth leagues did 
not have to be aware of the drug ban. They need only have sensed public rejection 
of professional teams. Similarly, if there is reason to believe that increased contact 
with people with disabilities afforded by the ADA exacerbated adverse affective 
attitudes toward them, then prospective parents need not have learned about the 
ADA for the law to have influenced their reproductive decisions. The law’s 
positive effect on employment and public accommodation norms could in this way 
“externalize” negative views about people with disabilities because the ADA led 
parents to encounter circumstances that gave rise to feelings of discomfort, pity, or 
abhorrence. 
Another mechanism might account for the “disappointing ADA” hypothesis. 
This second explanation turns on the fact that ADA-related media stories tended to 
depict people with disabilities in an unfavorable light. Mainstream media outlets 
                                                                                                                            
Drake tracked survey participants in three countries over three years to determine how 
society ascribes responsibility for the birth of a child with Down syndrome. Theresa 
Marteau & Harriet Drake, Attributions for Disability: The Influence of Genetic Screening, 
40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1127, 1128–29 (1995); cf. Sue Hall et al., Parents’ Attributions of 
Blame for the Birth of a Child with Down Syndrome: A Pilot Study, 12 PSYCH. & HEALTH 
579 (1997) (interviewing mothers and fathers of children with Down syndrome and finding 
that a significant minority blamed health professionals or the health care system for not 
preventing the birth of their children during the prenatal stage). Marteau and Drake 
interviewed more than 930 pregnant women, geneticists, obstetricians, and a general 
sample of men and women from Germany, Portugal, and England. Marteau & Drake, supra 
at 1128–29. Respondents were presented with two vignettes about the gestational histories 
of children who were born with Down syndrome. Id. at 1129. In the first, the child’s 
mother declined a genetic test that could have identified the extra Down-causing 
chromosome, on which basis she could have decided to abort the fetus. Id. at 1128–29. In 
the second vignette, the mother was not offered the test. Id. Marteau and Drake found that 
in the four respondent groups from all three countries, the mother’s screening history was 
the single most important factor influencing attributions of blame for the birth of a child 
with Down syndrome. Id. at 1129. Women declining the offer of testing were assigned 
overwhelmingly greater blame for the birth of a Down child than were women who were 
not offered tests and subsequently gave birth to a child with Down syndrome. Id. at 1129–
30. 
126  See supra Part III.C. 
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played a significant role in diffusing national and local news in the early 1990s.127 
Editorial and journalistic decisions about whether to cover and how to frame 
disability rights developments shaped popular discourse and influenced public 
attitudes about what it means to have a disability in America.128 When landmark 
legislation such as the ADA appeared before Congress, it “needed a messenger to 
convey its intent to the public. That messenger was the news media.”129 Given 
extensive media coverage of the ADA’s passage and preceding legislative debates, 
widely circulating newspapers and magazines served as “norm entrepreneurs,”130 
drawing on the ADA’s salience to construct new cognitive frames and public 
understanding about people with disabilities.131 
 Evidence from the early 1990s suggests that the media often portrayed people 
with disabilities either as economic burdens or as “supercrips,” i.e., extraordinary 
because they function despite having a disability.132 The empirical work of media 
content analysts John Clogston and Beth Haller builds a plausible bridge between 
                                                 
127  Coverage of the ADA “moved [the disability rights movement] into the 
consciousness of the whole of U.S. society.” BETH A. HALLER, NEWS COVERAGE OF 
DISABILITY ISSUES: FINAL REPORT FOR THE CENTER FOR AN ACCESSIBLE SOCIETY (1999), 
available at http://www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/coverage/0799haller.htm. For a 
summary of ADA media coverage, see Abby Ellin, Seeking Laws for Disability of the 
Attitude, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at G1; Janine Jackson, A Right, Not a Favor: 
Coverage of Disability Act Misses Historical Shift, EXTRA! Nov./Dec. 2000, 
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1048 (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (showing how media 
coverage tends to portray the ADA “as mainly a regulatory issue affecting private 
businesses, rather than a human rights issue facing society as a whole”); Mary Leonard, 
Disability Act’s Progress, Limits Marked, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2000, at A1; Carolyn 
Lochhead, Collecting on a Promise: Disabled Say They Are Still in Fight for Rights 10 
Years After Disabilities Act, S.F. CHRON., July 26, 2000, at A1 (discussing judicial 
implementation of the ADA’s access mandates); Disabilities Act a Decade Later: Activists 
Cautiously Celebrate 10 Years of Progress (ABC television broadcast July 26, 2000); Is 
the Disabilities Act Working?: Critics Argue Law Vague and Misused (CNN television 
broadcast July 25, 2000), available at http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/07/25/ 
ada.anniversary/index.html; The Washington Post Special Report: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/specials/socialpolicy/ada/ 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009).  
128  See HALLER, supra note 127. 
129  Beth Haller, How the News Frames Disability: Print Media Coverage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, in EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
ON DISABILITY 55, 55 (Barbara M. Altman & Sharon N. Barnartt eds., 2000). 
130  See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–97 (1998) (explaining how norms develop 
according to a three-stage life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm 
internalization). 
131  As Haller notes, “news stories about disability . . . can sway public opinion about . 
. . the cultural representations of people with disabilities in general.” HALLER, supra note 
127. 
132  See John S. Clogston, Disability Coverage in American Newspapers, in THE 
DISABLED, THE MEDIA, AND THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 102, at 45, 47. 
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the passage of the ADA and ensuing attitudes about persons with disabilities.133 
Clogston’s model of disability coverage classifies news articles as either 
“traditional” or “progressive.”134 “Traditional” depictions describe individuals with 
disabilities “as dysfunctioning in a medical or economic way,” while “progressive” 
portrayals emphasize civil rights and cultural pluralism.135 Clogston’s assessment 
of 363 articles from the first quarter of 1990 indicated that “medical treatment and 
institutionalization, government and private support programs, and victimization” 
dominated 60 percent of disability-related stories.136 In addition, 55 percent of the 
headlines used language consistent with the traditional model, often “refer[ring] to 
persons with disabilities with adjectives substituting for nouns (disabled, blind, 
etc.).”137 One can glean the ADA’s influence on affective attitudes through the 
media from a Seattle Times profile published in 1992. That article lamented the 
story of a young woman with Down syndrome in light of the new law: “At 22, 
Cathleen Haight has entered adulthood. She yearns to do things she thinks a 
woman should do . . . yet her mind is that of a 10-year-old.”138 “The Americans 
with Disabilities Act . . . is expected to increase employment of the disabled,” the 
profile continued, “though it may be some time before the change is felt.”139 
Focusing more closely on the relationship between media sources and 
disability-related stories, Haller concluded that the business community’s 
prevailing view about people with disabilities colored news reporting in ways that 
strongly typecast them as costly to society.140 Building on previous media 
studies,141 Haller maintained that a journalist’s choice of sources for an article 
substantially affects the piece’s ultimate tone and message about people with 
                                                 
133  For comparable studies of disability portrayals in the media, see DORIS ZAMES 
FLEISCHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO 
CONFRONTATION 207–10 (2001); CHARLES A. RILEY II, DISABILITY AND THE MEDIA: 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 69–108 (2005); Jack A. Nelson, Broken Images: Portrayals 
of Those with Disabilities in American Media, in THE DISABLED, THE MEDIA, AND THE 
INFORMATION AGE, supra note 102, at 1. 
134  Clogston, supra note 132, at 46. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 48. 
137  Id. at 49. 
138  Vanessa Ho, Cathleen Haight Wants To Live the Life of a 22-Year-Old, but She 
Faces Different Challenges—Special Hopes and Needs, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at 
F1. 
139  Id. 
140  See Beth Haller, Balancing Acts: Government, Business, and Disability Sources in 
News Representations of the ADA (1996) (unpublished manuscript). 
141  See, e.g., PHILLIP J. TICHENOR, GEORGE A. DONOHUE & CLARICE N. OLIEN, 
COMMUNITY CONFLICT & THE PRESS 79–80 (1980) (asserting that news media echo the 
views of a community’s power-holding elite); Pamela J. Shoemaker, The Communication 
of Deviance, in 8 PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 151, 172 (Brenda Dervin & 
Melvin J. Voigt eds., 1987) (stating that “journalists’ normative judgments . . . will draw 
and define the attention of those who control social change. The journalist acts as a 
surrogate judge of deviance for his or her audience members”). 
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disabilities.142 In a follow-up empirical study, Haller found that businesspeople or 
business groups accounted for more than half (55.2 percent) of all sources in ADA-
related news and feature articles appearing in twelve major newspapers and 
magazines between 1988 and 1993.143 She also discovered that two of the top three 
reasons given for the ADA’s passage were architectural access (26.5 percent) and 
labor market opportunities (18.3 percent).144 Business sources argued that 
“[m]aking society accessible for disabled people is not really worth the cost and 
overburdens businesses. . . . Accessibility is not profitable.”145 Small and midsized 
operators, in particular, expressed dismay that “the government [was] largely out 
of touch with . . . their cost of doing business” and that “the Americans with 
Disabilities Act [would] cost them more and thus have a negative impact on their 
businesses.”146 Media backlash was not limited to the business community. Three 
years after the ADA’s passage, a national youth sports leader asked in the Chicago 
Tribune: 
 
To accommodate a child in a wheelchair, are you now creating 
danger for the other kids? I think you are[;] . . . there’s nothing built into 
the Americans with Disabilities Act that protects the safety of those who 
aren’t disabled. The easy solution, if there is enough of a pool, is to 
create a separate league.147 
 
Negative media messages related to the ADA could have been the very 
messages received and internalized by prospective parents considering whether to 
give birth to a child with a disability. We offer this claim, as with the others 
presented in Part III, as no more than hypotheses, without further evidence or 
argument. Nor are the “uplifting” or “disappointing” hypotheses necessarily 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive accounts of the ADA’s expressivist function, if 
any exists. The ADA may have produced no discernible effect on reproductive 
behavior at all, or the uplifting and disappointing accounts could have operated 
simultaneously to shape attitudes and practices in complex ways that led to 
counterbalance or dominance by one of the competing narratives. We test these 
hypotheses through empirical examination in Part IV and through analytical 
reasoning in Part V. 
 
 
                                                 
142  Haller, supra note 140. 
143  Haller, supra note 129, at 65. 
144  Id. at 64. 
145  Id. at 61. 
146  Wilma Randle, Small Businesses Grow into a Major Player Series: Back to 
Business. Another Report on the Struggle by Different Sectors of the U.S. Economy to Hone 
Their Competitive Edge, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1992, at 1. 
147  Mary Hill & Andy Trees, Dream on Hold for Boy with Down’s, CHI. TRIB., May 
21, 1993, at 1. 
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IV. THE EMPIRICS OF DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION 
 
In Part IV, we analyze whether either of the two hypotheses in Part III finds 
support in empirical data on Down syndrome birthrates after a positive fetal 
diagnosis for the condition. Our econometric approach resembles a program 
evaluation for which it is standard to estimate regression coefficients from a 
reduced form equation. We do so here. This technique measures variation in 
critical variables over time and across states that might have generated variation in 
the Down syndrome birthrate. We study birthrate patterns not only because 
currently available abortion data contain little to no information about fetal 
characteristics, but also because medical treatment has not successfully and 
independently reduced prenatal disability rates. Any decline in the Down 
syndrome birthrate would more likely follow from increased termination rates 
rather than more miscarriages148 or medical interventions on behalf of the affected 
fetus. In Part IV(A), we describe the data used to test the hypotheses from Part III. 
Section IV(B) presents and interprets our empirical results. 
Our analysis yields suggestive evidence that the ADA led to a short-term 
decline in the Down syndrome birthrate. By 1993, the birthrate fell by between 13 
and 18 per 100,000 relative to the pre-ADA period when controlling for 
demographic and medical care variables. We do not find any significant effect for 
two lesser-known disabilities for which screening technologies also exist. When 
we compare birthrate changes for infants with spina bifida and cleft palate before 
and after the ADA’s passage, no coefficient in the fully specified model is 
significant. In addition, the signs switch from negative to positive between the 
unadjusted and fully specified regression models. The decline in Down syndrome 
birthrates coincided with steady amniocentesis rates and increased sharply at the 
same time screening became less frequent. These collective findings suggest 
persuasively that the ADA’s effect on reproductive decision making was in large 
part responsible for the mid-1990s decline in the birthrate of children with Down 
syndrome. 
As Donohue and Levitt emphasized in their study of abortion and crime,149 
the explanation we offer here likewise represents one of several plausible accounts. 
A skeptical reader might even accept our statistical findings but still not agree with 
our narrative premise. In fact, labor economist Daniel Hamermesh, who has used 
the Donohue and Levitt study in the classroom, stated: “I’ve gone over [the] paper 
in draft, in its printed version, at great length, and for the life of me I can’t see 
                                                 
148  Genetic tests for Down syndrome usually are performed fifteen to sixteen weeks 
into the gestation period. See Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867, 
1871 (2002). After that point, the likelihood of miscarriage is about 1 to 3 percent. See, 
e.g., Statistics, http://www.pregnancyloss.info/info-howcommon.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2009). 
149  Donohue & Levitt, supra note 81, at 380 (“While acknowledging that [a number 
of other factors] may have also served to dampen crime, we consider a novel explanation 
for the sudden crime drop of the 1990s: the decision to legalize abortion over a quarter 
century ago.”). 
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anything wrong with it[.] . . . On the other hand, I don’t believe a word of it.”150 
We do not wish to equate what we demonstrate in this Article to what Donohue 
and Levitt achieved in their study, which has withstood several rounds of scholarly 
criticism151 and has been confirmed by alternative data sources152 over the seven 
years since its publication.153 To the extent that our empirical and conceptual 
analyses are sound, however, the endurance of Donohue and Levitt’s bold claim 
lends credibility to the facially improbable connection we propose between the 
ADA and selective abortion on the basis of disability. 
 
A.  Data 
 
1. Sources 
Beginning in 1968, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
through the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), collected samples of 
birth records from the fifty states and the District of Columbia.154 In the early years 
of the program, “[d]ata were obtained from a 50-percent sample of certificates.”155 
However, “[s]tarting in 1972 all records were included for States that participated 
in the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program (VSCP).”156 “The number of States 
participating in the VSCP increased from 6 in 1972 to 46 in 1984,” and “beginning 
in 1985, all States and the District of Columbia participated.”157 The CDC data 
files contain information from every field on the birth certificate, including 
demographic information about the child’s parents and various indicators of 
                                                 
150  Stephen J. Dubner, The Probability that a Real-Estate Agent is Cheating You (and 
Other Riddles of Modern Life), N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 3, 2003, at 24. 
151  See, e.g., Christopher L. Foote & Christopher F. Goetz, Comment, The Impact of 
Legalized Abortion on Crime: Comment, 123 Q.J. ECON. 407, 421–22 (2008); Ted Joyce, 
Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 1–3 (2004). 
152  See, e.g., Cristian Pop-Eleches, The Impact of an Abortion Ban on Socioeconomic 
Outcomes of Children: Evidence from Romania, 114 J. POL. ECON. 744, 769–70 (2006) 
(attributing declines in educational and labor market outcomes for Romanian children to 
the 1966 ban on abortion); Anindya Sen, Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? 
Evaluating the Relationship between Crime, Abortion, and Fertility, 7 B.E. J. ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 31–32 (2007) (refining the Donohue and Levitt theory using 
Canadian fertility data). 
153  See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Steven D. Levitt: 2003 John Bates Clark Medalist, 19 
J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 188–90 (2005) (citing the Donohue and Levitt study as a major factor 
in the American Economic Association’s awarding Levitt the John Bates Clark Medal, 
which is given every two years to one American economist under the age of forty who has 
made a significant contribution to economic thought). 
154  NCHS–NVSS–Description, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm (last visited Sept. 
1, 2009). 
155  Natality Data, Public-Use Data Files, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/ 
elec_prods/subject/natality.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
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maternal and newborn health. Of particular interest for our study is information on 
the obstetric practices of parents who chose to bring a child with a disability to 
term. If the ADA had some effect on the incidence of Down-selective abortion, we 
hypothesize that the empirical model will detect changes in the frequency of fetal 
diagnoses of Down syndrome. It should be noted that birth certificates before 1989 
specified whether the newborn had a congenital anomaly; only after a 1989 change 
in the design of birth certificates did medical attendants record specific disabilities. 
For this reason, we use data from 1989—the first year for which prenatal screening 
data also appear—through 2002, the last year for which birth certificate data are 
available. The information contained on these birth certificates has been 
transcribed into electronic data files, which are accessible through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).158 
One might object that using just one year of data to identify the pre-ADA 
period limits the value of any attempt at before-and-after econometric 
specification. There are two reasons why this objection should not be overstated. 
First, because it generally takes nine months to carry a child from fertilization until 
birth, any changes in reproductive decision making that could be attributed to the 
law’s passage would not appear in the Down syndrome birthrate until after 
approximately 1991, one year after the ADA was passed. Our analysis therefore 
assumes that the years 1989 and 1990 form the “pre-ADA” period. Second, and 
more important, any expressive externalities from the ADA would operate with 
some delay. The impact of “cascading” norms emerges only after sufficient social 
pressure builds toward a tipping point for conformity around emergent attitudes 
and behaviors.159 However, because we cannot claim with any certainty when the 
externality reached its peak effect, we examine changes relative to the 1989–90 
period for each year from 1991 to 2002. We elaborate in Part IV(B)(1) on reasons 
for the break in the birthrate trend between 1990 and 1991. 
 
2. Summary Statistics 
 
The raw natality data between the years 1989 and 2002 include a wide array 
of demographic and physical characteristics for 56,068,370 births.160 As the 
summary statistics in Table 1 show, about 52 children with Down syndrome were 
born per 100,000 across the United States over the period 1989–2002. We also 
document, for comparison purposes,161 the spina bifida birthrate, which averaged 
about 25 per 100,000 over the same period. The full list of explanatory variables 
                                                 
158  Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Natality Detail File 
Series, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00036.xml (last visited Sept. 
1, 2009). 
159  See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945–46 
(1996). 
160  In addition to recoding variables for missing or undocumented values, we remove 
all births to foreign residents. 
161  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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culled from the NCHS natality files (also appearing in Table 1) controls for factors 
that are unrelated to or mildly correlated with passage of the ADA and might have 
induced variation in reproductive outcomes.162 Research published soon after the 
ADA’s passage suggests potential relationships between these covariates and 
Down syndrome birthrates.163 First, we might expect the incidence of disability-
selective abortion to be higher among white women relative to minorities because, 
according to one anthropological study, “about half of minority women [in New 
York City] [did] not keep their appointments for counseling or prenatal 
diagnosis.”164 In addition, some research found that “college-educated, upper-
income career women [were] less willing to risk having a disabled child than 
women with less education and income.”165 Thus, we would expect the numerical 
sign on college education to be negative, implying a lower probability of Down 
syndrome births. 
The remaining variables capture the fertility and medical histories of women 
choosing to give birth during our observation period. As with maternal and 
gestational age,166 one might expect that a greater number of preexisting children 
will reduce the probability that women carry a fetus with a disability to full term, 
especially if their living children are not impaired.167 One of the key indicators for 
                                                 
162  An ideal model would include information on news media reports given the 
empirical evidence reported by Clogston and Haller. See supra notes 127–145 and 
accompanying text. The utility of such data, however, seems rather low in a regression 
model given that the quantity of positive and negative news reports omits the essential, 
qualitative characteristics that Clogston and Haller also emphasize.  
163  See Wertz, supra note 76, at 167–70. 
164  Id. at 170 (citing Rayna Rapp, Constructing Amniocentesis: Maternal and 
Medical Discourses, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
28 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990); Rayna Rapp, The Power of 
“Positive” Diagnosis: Medical and Maternal Discourses on Amniocentesis, in CHILDBIRTH 
IN AMERICA: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 103 (Karen L. Michaelson ed., 1988); 
Rayna Rapp, Chromosomes and Communication: The Discourse of Genetic Counseling, 2 
MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 143 (1988)). 
165  See Wertz, supra note 76, at 170 (citing KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE 
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); Diane Beeson & Mitchell S. Golbus, Decision Making: 
Whether or Not To Have Prenatal Diagnosis and Abortion for X-linked Conditions, 20 AM. 
J. MED. GENETICS 107 (1985)). 
166  See Ralph L. Kramer et al., Determinants of Parental Decisions After the Prenatal 
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, 79 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 172, 172–74 (1998) (analyzing 
all cases of Down syndrome at a tertiary care center from 1989–1997 with respect to 
maternal age, parity, gestational age, sonographic findings, insurance status, and race, and 
finding that when Down syndrome is diagnosed prenatally, the choice of termination is 
related to maternal age and gestational age, but only gestational age is a significant 
independent predictor of pregnancy termination). 
167  See David T. Helm et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: Mothers’ 
Reflections on Supports Needed from Diagnosis to Birth, 36 MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 60 
(1998) (discussing the perceived challenges of raising a child with a disability alongside 
other children). 
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assessing our central hypothesis is the percentage of births subject to 
amniocentesis. This captures trends for the most commonly used Down syndrome 
diagnostic test.168 Finally, we detail the medical care sought by women who chose 
to give birth to a child with Down syndrome. Presumably, the chances of detecting 
Down syndrome should increase (at a diminishing marginal rate) with the number 
of prenatal medical consultations. 
 
B. Results 
 
1. Graphical Evidence 
 
Figure 1 displays two national time series: the birthrate of infants with Down 
syndrome and the number of births screened through amniocentesis (each per 
100,000) from 1989 to 2002. The natality files include separate variables for each 
congenital anomaly listed on the birth certificate. These variables are multinomial, 
taking one of four values: “reported,” “not reported,” “not on certificate,” and “not 
classifiable.”169 We assume that the latter two categories are comparable to “no 
reported condition,” which appeared in the aggregated anomaly variable before 
1989. Thus, we recast the Down syndrome indicator as a dichotomous one, coding 
only “reported” values as positive diagnoses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
168  See Nicholas J. Wald et al., Antenatal Screening for Down’s Syndrome, 4 J. MED. 
SCREENING 181, 223 (1997). 
169  Natality Data, Public-Use Data Files, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/ 
elec_prods/subject/natality.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
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Figure 1: Down Syndrome Birthrates and Conditional Amniocentesis Rates 
(1989–2002) 
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Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Files. 
 
 
Two features of the time series stand out in Figure 1. First, the Down 
syndrome birthrate trend, measured on the left axis, breaks sharply after 1990, 
falling about 9 percent from 48 children per 100,000 to 43 in 1991. Despite small 
increases in 1992 and 1996, the birthrate falls to a low of 42 per 100,000 in 1995. 
Starting in 1998, however, the share of Down syndrome births rises and nearly 
reaches its pre-ADA level by 2002. 
On the secondary vertical axis, we measure the number of births for which the 
mother underwent an amniotic screening (again, per 100,000). The trend in the late 
1980s through the mid–1990s appears relatively constant, remaining at an average 
of 3,100 screenings per 100,000 live births. The amniocentesis rate, however, 
drops steadily from 1997 through 2002. This decline in prenatal screening 
accompanies a rise in Down syndrome births. Before 1997, however, the Down 
syndrome birthrate fell off in the absence of any change in screening patterns. 
Figure 1 represents the foundation for the following empirical analysis. It will 
also help determine whether either of the hypotheses in Part III has explanatory 
power, and if so, which dominates. The sharp downward trend in the Down 
syndrome birthrate through the mid-1990s implies that the data potentially support 
the “disappointing ADA” theory. However, its influence was most likely a short-
term phenomenon, since the birthrate rebounded between 1995 and 2002. Several 
factors could explain the trend reversal in 1995, including the eventual emergence 
of an “uplifting ADA” story or, more simply, a gradual weakening of the ADA’s 
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negative externality. Nevertheless, the final data point in Figure 1 lies below the 
1989–1990 levels, which indicates that the initial negative expressive effect was 
not completely eliminated by 2002. Thus, the available data suggest that overall 
Down syndrome births remained lower than they would have been had the ADA 
not been enacted. 
Second, the amniocentesis birthrate line in Figure 1 could be misleading in 
ways that crucially affect interpretation about selective abortion. We claim that the 
amniocentesis rate remained fairly constant through the mid-1990s, but the data, 
by definition, exclude screenings that resulted in terminations. Thus, if 
amniocentesis rates increased in the 1990s and abortions after Down syndrome 
diagnoses increased, these screenings would not appear in Figure 1 even though 
they occurred. However, “[a]bout 98 percent of the women who have 
amniocentesis will receive the . . . news that their fetuses are free of the conditions 
for which they have been tested. The other 2 percent will . . . confront the . . . news 
that their fetus has a disability.”170 Thus, under the assumption that parents are 
more likely to bear children without prenatal disabilities, all else equal, deriving 
the amniocentesis birthrate from live births should not be confounded significantly 
by selective abortion practices. This assumption permits reasonable inference 
about changes in the overall amniocentesis rate with changes in the amniocentesis 
birthrate. 
 
2. Regression Results 
 
Having explored the general time trends of Down syndrome birthrates as well 
as the incidence of amniocentesis during the observation period, we now turn to 
multivariate regression analysis. The first set of models is based on the following 
equation: 
 
0 1990
1991
J
st j j st st
j
BR I Zβ β δ σ ε−
=
= + + + +∑    (1). 
 
BRst is the Down syndrome birthrate in state s and year t; Ij is an indicator variable 
for each year j (J = 2002); Zst is a vector of control variables for each state-year 
pair, and σ represents state fixed effects. Since our observation period begins in 
1989, the year effects are estimated relative to the pre-ADA period from 1989 to 
1990. For example, the coefficient for the variable I1995 (β5) represents the change 
in the Down syndrome birthrate, all else constant, between 1995 and the pre-ADA 
years. 
 Before discussing the results, we explain the rationale for the empirical 
specification in (1). Analyses of legal interventions on social and economic 
                                                 
170  Rayna Rapp, The Power of “Positive” Diagnosis: Medical and Maternal 
Discourses on Amniocentesis, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 204, 205 (Donna 
Bassin et al. eds., 1994). 
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outcomes often rely on difference-in-differences models. In these models, the first 
difference compares outcomes for “control” and “treated” observations, and the 
second difference usually compares the first difference before and after the law’s 
effective date. Had we been able to obtain individual-level data on reproductive 
decisions, including whether disability-selective abortion occurred, we naturally 
would have followed the difference-in-differences framework. The “treated” 
observations would include all mothers who underwent amniotic screening, and 
the pre-ADA period for the second difference would remain observations from the 
years 1989 and 1990.171 Because of our data limitations, which required 
aggregation to a larger unit of analysis (the state of residence), sensible difference-
in-differences analysis options would generate sample selection bias. For example, 
we might restrict the data to Down syndrome births and use difference-in-
differences to examine changes before and after the ADA for women who did and 
did not use amniocentesis. However, this method would eliminate the relative 
frequency of Down syndrome births to non-Down syndrome births—the very data 
we need to show whether the ADA affected the selective abortion rate in either 
direction. 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows results from the most parsimonious possible 
model, i.e., one that calculates raw (unadjusted) differences across time. As shown 
in Figure 1, the Down syndrome birthrate declined immediately after passage of 
the ADA. Nevertheless, the year-by-year decline does not achieve statistical 
significance until 1993, and the magnitude of these decreases remains high through 
1999. However we explain these findings, the point estimate for 1995 (-11) is 
astounding; such a change represents one half of one standard deviation. Columns 
2 and 3 add demographic and medical controls, respectively, via the vector Zst as 
well as state fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity (especially variation 
in religious affiliation and general health in the state population). In most cases, the 
absolute value of the annual estimates increases (implying larger declines) and 
remains statistically significant through the period 1993–97. Finally, Column 4 
represents the most fully specified model captured by (1). In this version, all the 
coefficient estimates from 1993 through 1998 are between 13 and 18 in absolute 
value. Thus, relative to the pre-ADA period 1989–90, the declines in successive 
years represent substantial changes in the birthrates of children with Down 
syndrome. 
Point estimates for all control variables used in the four variations on (1) are 
presented in the second half of Table 2. Column 4 indicates that maternal age, 
prenatal visits, and amniocentesis rates are all positively correlated with Down 
syndrome birthrates. None of these factors, however, is statistically significant. On 
average, married, white, and college-educated women, as well as women with 
more living children, are less likely to give birth to a child with Down syndrome. 
The negative sign on the two significantly estimated variables (race and birth 
                                                 
171  Even still, we would not have access to individual-level decisions whether to give 
birth or terminate a pregnancy over time. Without such information, an individual-level 
difference-in-differences analysis would be meaningless. 
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order) further validates our empirical model. That is, the negative coefficient on 
maternal race and birth order supports two findings: first, that white women are 
more likely to have access to and use screening technologies; and, second, that 
parents are more likely to abort a Down syndrome fetus the more children they 
already have. 
How do these results, which examine patterns in birthrates, relate to our 
analysis of selective abortion practices? First, note that Columns 2–4 in Table 2 
include the number of births (per 100,000) subjected to amniotic screening as a 
control variable. Given that this rate remained relatively constant during the years 
between 1992 and 1997, one would not expect a variable with minimal variation to 
affect estimates of the β coefficients. Once the rate of amniocentesis began to fall, 
though, the declines relative to 1989–90 no longer are statistically significant. We 
interpret this result as highly suggestive evidence that antidiscrimination law 
engendered an expressive effect on Down syndrome births. Controlling as well for 
a host of factors that likely correlate with reproductive decisions, we still find 
robust decreases in the incidence of newborns with disabilities after passage of the 
ADA while prenatal screening frequencies remained virtually invariant. Finally, if 
the law actually produced expressive externalities—as opposed to some other 
account that could better explain the observed birthrate drops—we would not 
expect to observe these collateral effects as soon as the law was passed.172 
As Figure 1 suggested, and the regression results confirmed, the expressive 
externality (if it operated) was confined to the short term, from roughly 1993 
through 1998. This appears not only through the lack of statistical significance 
after 1998 but also through the upswing in the Down syndrome birthrate beginning 
in the late 1990s. These findings can be explained in one of two ways, neither of 
which can be tested formally with the available data.173 First, the salience of 
negative attitudes about Down syndrome could have dissolved over time such that 
the expressive externality ceased to affect reproductive decisions systematically 
after a certain period. Second, it might be the case that positive externalities 
emerged and outweighed any negative expressive effects. Either way, although the 
Down syndrome birthrate rose after the mid-1990s, it remained below the pre-
ADA levels observed in 1989 and 1990. Thus, even if the negative expressive 
externalities operate only in the short term, its effects may continue to have 
meaningful long-term effects on reproductive outcomes. 
No advances in prenatal or postnatal medical therapy have exogenously 
reduced the rate at which children with disabilities are brought to term. Conditional 
upon a fetus developing Down syndrome, the only way that parents can prevent the 
birth of a child with disabilities is to terminate the pregnancy.174 This important 
fact rules out any variation in birthrates attributable to causes outside of parental 
choice, and controls for any preferences or genetic propensities that would 
                                                 
172  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
173  We are grateful to Jack Balkin for bringing this point to our attention. 
174  See Nancy J. Roizen & David Patterson, Down’s Syndrome, 361 LANCET 1281, 
1282 (2003). 
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correlate with a higher probability of Down syndrome births. Abortion rates are 
not the only measure of revealed preference for raising children with Down 
syndrome. Parents could decide to bring a child with Down syndrome to term and 
then place the child in an adoption agency. Further insight can be gleaned from 
analysis of the rate at which biological parents chose to place children with Down 
syndrome up for adoption and the rate at which adoptive parents chose to adopt 
children with Down syndrome. We consider adoption figures in the context of 
socioeconomic changes, changes in adoption laws, and other confounding 
variables.175 The absence of adoption data in our study means that the observed 
decline in Down syndrome birthrates represents a lower bound on parental 
disinclinations to raise a child with this disability. The existence of the adoption 
alternative, however, does not complicate our empirical findings with respect to 
birthrates. Since adoption rates are conditional on birthrates, our data also capture 
some of the ADA’s effect on adoption. Parental decisions to place a child with 
Down syndrome up for adoption may have increased or decreased after 1990. 
Regardless, our findings indicate that there were significantly fewer children born 
with Down syndrome that could have been placed with adoption agencies. 
We interpret these regression results as evidence of an expressive externality 
because statistically significant declines in the Down syndrome birthrate coincided 
with a relatively constant amniocentesis rate. Ruling out the effect of changing 
medical diagnostics and personal characteristics, the “residual” explanation for 
falling birthrates could be the cascading norm shift regarding selective abortion set 
off by the ADA. On the other hand, the eventual birthrate increase that occurred 
when amniocentesis rates fell was statistically insignificant; otherwise, there would 
be more support for the proposition that changes in amniocentesis rates drove 
changes in Down syndrome birthrates. The magnitudes of our estimated 
coefficients (up to 18 per 100,000) might appear insignificant in absolute terms, 
but declines of this size are quite substantial relative to the pre-ADA distribution of 
Down syndrome birthrates.176 The numerical significance of the post-ADA 
birthrate drop (13 to 18 per 100,000) relative to the pre-ADA mean (52 per 
100,000) serves to underscore the importance of these results. 
                                                 
175  Although we controlled for demographic changes in race and class over the period 
we investigated, these factors surely influenced prenatal testing rates. In a 1980 study of 
genetic testing among prospective parents in the state of Georgia, for example, prenatal 
diagnosis was used by 60 percent of urban white women over forty, but by just 0.5 percent 
of rural black women over forty. See David C. Sokol et al., Prenatal Chromosome 
Diagnosis: Racial and Geographic Variation for Older Women in Georgia, 244 JAMA 
1355, 1356–57 (1980); see also Rayna Rapp, Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings 
of Bioscience in a Multicultural World, 23 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 45, 67 (1998) 
(“With better access [to information about prenatal testing], middle-class women are also 
less able to achieve any distance from the biomedical discourse within which their own 
rationality is forged. Those without much privileged scientific education are most likely to 
reject testing altogether . . . .”). 
176  See infra tbl. 1. 
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If our narrative about expressive externalities and Down syndrome birthrates 
is plausible, then we should not expect to observe similar changes for other 
congenital anomalies that generated significantly less social anxiety and received 
much less media coverage.177 In Tables 3 and 4, we amend the baseline model to 
account for variation in the birthrates of spina bifida178 and cleft palate,179 two 
other high-frequency congenital abnormalities.180 These data provide a relatively 
clean comparative test for whether social or medical salience, which we posit is a 
necessary condition for expressive externalities to emerge, motivated the decline in 
the Down syndrome rate. In Table 3, Column 1, the unadjusted annual differences 
suggest that negative expressive externalities might have generated similar effects 
for children with spina bifida. Although the coefficient estimates are not as large 
(in absolute value) as with Down syndrome, the results between 1998 and 2002 are 
either statistically significant or marginally insignificant. The significance of these 
results vanishes, however, when we include the full set of control variables in 
Column 4. No annual point estimate is statistically significant in that specification. 
More important, the Column 1 estimates were so fragile that most negative 
coefficients became positive with the introduction of controls. In Table 4, no 
coefficient estimate for cleft palate is estimated with enough precision to echo the 
expressive effects detected for Down syndrome. Together, Tables 3 and 4 indicate 
that the case of Down syndrome was uniquely affected by the ADA’s passage. 
It may be worth trying to distinguish parental attitudes about the prospect of 
children with mental disabilities as opposed to physical disabilities. One reason to 
think the reproductive calculus varies depending on whether the disability in 
                                                 
177  As expected, Down syndrome received far more extensive media coverage during 
the relevant period than spina bifida, cleft lip/palate, or other genetic anomalies. A search 
of the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and Chicago Tribune 
between 1988 and 1993 reveals that Down syndrome, spina bifida, and cleft lip/palate 
appeared in 1028, 436, and 156 articles, respectively. 
178  Spina bifida is a neural tube disorder involving an incompletely formed spinal 
cord. The condition results in varying degrees of paralysis and is sometimes associated 
with cognitive problems. Hope Northrup & Kelly Volcik, Spina Bifida and Other Neural 
Tube Defects, 30 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRICS 317, 327–29 (2000). 
179  Cleft palate is a genetic abnormality in which the two plates that form the roof of 
the mouth are not fully connected. The condition is usually correctable through surgery, but 
may cause problems with feeding, speech, and socialization. Francesco Carinci et al., 
Genetics of Nonsyndromic Cleft Lip and Palate: A Review of International Studies and 
Data Regarding the Italian Population, 37 CLEFT PALATE-CRANIOFACIAL J. 33, 35–36 
(2000). 
180  The remaining conditions reported in the natality data are anencephalus, 
hydrocephalus, microcephalus, “other” central nervous system anomalies, heart 
malformations, “other” circulatory conditions, rectal atresia, tracheo conditions, 
omphalocele, “other” gastrointestinal anomalies, malformed genitalia, renal agenesis, 
“other” urogential anomalies, polydactly/syndactyly/adactyly, club foot, diaphragmatic 
hernia, “other” musculoskeletal anomalies, “other” chromosomal anomalies, and “other” 
congenital anomalies. See Natality Data, Public-Use Data Files, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/products/elec_prods/subject/natality.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
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question is predominantly mental or physical in nature relates to the labor market. 
Children with predominantly physical disabilities might be expected to obtain 
competitive jobs more easily (relative to children with predominantly mental 
disabilities) as adults in a twenty-first century employment market that 
increasingly values information processing skills over physical talents or sensory 
abilities. The distinction between mental and physical disabilities is not altogether 
straightforward in the case of Down syndrome, however, which typically results in 
both varying levels of mental retardation and a range of physical impairments.181 
At any rate, the cognitive limitations that people tend to associate with the 
condition buttress our expressivist interpretation of the ADA. Considering Wertz’s 
eight factors, prospective parents may believe that future employers will consider 
adults with Down syndrome too unproductive (Wertz’s second factor) or focus on 
the fact that medical treatment cannot reverse the physical or cognitive limitations 
associated with Down syndrome (her fourth factor). However, it seems plausible 
that the overall salience of a disability matters more for any effect that expressive 
externalities have on the reproductive utility function than whether the disability is 
primarily mental or physical. Our empirical analysis does not test this hypothesis 
directly. 
Given the strong correlation between maternal age and the likelihood of a 
fetus developing Down syndrome,182 we divide all birth records into two groups 
with age thirty-five as a cutoff. We use thirty-five as a threshold because the 
medical community traditionally has recommended amniocentesis for women who 
are at least that age and also because “[m]ore than 90 percent of all children and 70 
to 80 percent of children with Down’s syndrome are born to women younger than 
35 years of age.”183 
Table 5 suggests that most of the negative expressive effects estimated for 
Down syndrome actually arose in the younger maternal cohort. In this table we 
present only the unadjusted and fully specified models for both groups. As Column 
2 shows, declines in the Down syndrome birthrate were much steeper and lasted 
longer for women younger than thirty-five than among the entire set of births. On 
average, between 1993 and 1999 the birthrate drop was about 16 per 100,000. 
Column 4, describing the same changes in Down syndrome births for women age 
thirty-five and older, shows even higher point estimates over the same period. 
However, the noisiness of the data (due to the lower frequency of births among 
women older than thirty-five) renders all of the coefficients insignificant. Although 
this noise prevents us from drawing firm conclusions, Table 5 would seem to 
support our interpretation that the ADA produced a negative expressive effect. 
Since women younger than thirty-five give birth to the vast majority of Down 
                                                 
181  J.R. Korenberg et al., Down Syndrome Phenotypes: The Consequences of 
Chromosomal Imbalance, 91 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 4997, 5000 (1994). 
182  See Ernest. B. Hook et al., Chromosomal Abnormality Rates at Amniocentesis and 
in Live-Born Infants, 249 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2034, 2036–38 (1983). 
183  Susan P. Pauker & Stephen G. Pauker, Prenatal Diagnosis: Why Is 35 a Magic 
Number?, 220 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1151, 1151 (1994). 
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syndrome children, and about 90 percent of pregnant women carrying a fetus 
diagnosed with the condition choose termination,184 the substantial declines 
observed in Table 5 likely were due to selective abortion.185 
To be clear, we do not claim to have detected a causal statistical relationship 
between the ADA and changes in the Down syndrome birthrate. We have used the 
best available natality information simply to show that shifts in otherwise stable 
birthrate patterns could plausibly have followed from passage of the ADA. Our 
regression analysis shows significant declines in the Down syndrome birthrate 
while controlling for a multitude of critical variables correlated with reproductive 
decisions. The absence of data on actual Down-selective terminations and of 
comprehensive interview responses by prospective parents who face this decision 
caution against drawing broad conclusions. Nevertheless, these findings are 
sufficiently robust to suggest that the “disappointing” hypothesis we proposed in 
Section III(B) has greater independent plausibility or net influence than the 
“uplifting” hypothesis from Section III(A). Further investigation into other family 
planning spheres such as adoption or artificial reproductive technologies might 
weaken or reinforce this conclusion.186 
 
V. THE ANALYTICS OF DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION 
 
A complex array of legal, material, economic, technological, social, familial, 
and medical factors might reasonably inform prenatal testing and selective abortion 
for Down syndrome.187 Technological factors include the predictive accuracy, 
procedural invasiveness, and medical risks of diagnostic techniques,188 as well as 
the gestational age for which effective prenatal testing is available.189 Legal factors 
                                                 
184  Harmon, supra note 2. 
185  Another possibility is that amniocentesis rates by age changed over the 1990s such 
that women under thirty-five switched to less invasive procedures such as the triple 
screen/AFP test. If so, this technological shift might explain the relative decrease in Down 
syndrome births among younger women. However, our natality data show that 
amniocentesis rates remained steady among both the younger cohort (about 2 percent) and 
the older cohort (about 15 percent) during the early to mid-1990s. 
186  See infra Part VI. 
187  See D.I. Bromage, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Result of the 
Cultural Turn?, 32 MED. HUMAN. 38, 39–41 (2006) (describing a range of influences that 
may be brought on women who are carriers of genetic diseases). 
188  See Jennifer A. Bubb & Anne L. Matthews, What’s New in Prenatal Screening 
and Diagnosis?, 31 PRIMARY CARE: CLINICS OFF. PRAC. 561, 563 (2004) (describing 
current methods for prenatal genetic screening and diagnosis including carrier testing, 
maternal serum screening, ultrasonography, as well as diagnostic alternatives to 
amniocentesis including chorionic villus sampling and preimplantation diagnosis). 
189  See Susan Michie et al., Prenatal Tests: How Are Women Deciding?, 19 
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 743, 744–46 (1999) (assessing systematic decision making for 
genetic testing at sixteen weeks’ gestation). 
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might include informed-consent laws190 and other government regulations;191 
public funding;192 or tort litigation193 with respect to genetic testing and abortion. 
Relevant material factors include the availability of institutions that provide 
genetic testing;194 the required waiting period for genetic testing services,195 and 
challenges with transportation or child care to allow for medical services.196 
Economic factors might include social status;197 availability of insurance coverage, 
government funding, or personal funds to pay for genetic testing198 or abortion 
services;199 financial ability to support a child with a genetic disability or 
disease;200 and the anticipation of denied coverage or increased costs for health and 
life insurance for avoidable or preexisting conditions.201 Salient social issues 
include pressure by nonfamilial individuals;202 ethnic, cultural, and religious 
                                                 
190  Jean Gekas et al., Informed Consent to Serum Screening for Down Syndrome: Are 
Women Given Adequate Information?, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1, 3–6 (1999). 
191  See Ellen Wright Clayton, What the Law Says About Reproductive Genetic 
Testing and What It Doesn’t, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 131, 177 (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. 
Thomson eds., 1994). 
192  Id. at 137. 
193  Id. at 151–52. 
194  See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Feminist Criticism of Prenatal 
Diagnosis: A Response, 36 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 541, 543–44 (1993). 
195  Marilyn L. Poland et al., Barriers to Receiving Adequate Prenatal Care, 157 AM. 
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 297, 302 (1987). 
196  Id. at 300. 
197  Babak Khoshnood et al., Advances in Medical Technology and Creation of 
Disparities: The Case of Down Syndrome, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2139, 2143 (2006) 
(concluding that Down syndrome risk does not vary according to socioeconomic status). 
198  See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Genetic Services for Low-Income 
Women and Women of Color: Access and Sociocultural Issues, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL 
TESTING, supra note 191, at 234–35.  
199  See R. Alta Charo & Karen H. Rothenberg, “The Good Mother”: The Limits of 
Reproductive Accountability and Genetic Choice, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING, at 
195. The concern about unequal access to abortions was echoed by Justice Ginsburg in a 
recent interview. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
July 12, 2009, at 22, 47 (quoting Justice Ginsburg) (“The states that had changed their 
abortion laws before Roe [to make abortion legal] are not going to change back. So we 
have a policy that affects only poor women . . . .”).  
200  See generally Babak Khoshnood et al., Socioeconomic and State-Level 
Differences in Prenatal Diagnosis and Live Birth Prevalence of Down’s Syndrome in the 
United States, 51 REV. EPIDEMIOLOGY 617 (2003) (examining the impact of socioeconomic 
differences in prenatal testing on disparities in the live birth prevalence of congenital 
anomalies). 
201  See Philip Jacobs & Suzanne McDermott, Family Caregiver Costs of Chronically 
Ill and Handicapped Children: Method and Literature Review, 104 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 
158, 159–60 (1989). 
202  See Deborah Kaplan, Prenatal Screening and Its Impact on Persons with 
Disabilities, 36 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 605, 609–11 (1993). 
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differences in parental attitudes toward genetic testing or abortion;203 and 
knowledge about the possibility, benefits, and risks of genetic testing.204 
Expectations imposed by family members,205 the prospective impact of a 
genetically affected child on the family unit,206 and costs and burdens to primary 
caregivers of children with genetic disabilities207 may also play a role. Finally, 
medical factors might include the delivery of genetic information by physicians 
and counselors,208 maternal and gestational age,209 and personal anxiety about 
genetic testing or abortion.210 
At first glance, any of these potential influences seems capable of explaining 
changes in prenatal testing or selective abortion rates. On closer inspection, 
however, it appears less likely that these factors, either independently or in 
combination, fully account for the Down syndrome birthrate decline in the years 
after the ADA’s passage. We consider the potential influence of each factor in 
turn, beginning with prenatal diagnostic technology. 
Although the technology of prenatal testing developed dramatically both in 
the decades prior to the enactment of the ADA and since the year 2000, the 1990s 
saw few technological advances in fetal testing.211 The oldest and most common 
                                                 
203  See Rayna Rapp, Women’s Responses to Prenatal Diagnosis: A Sociocultural 
Perspective on Diversity, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING, supra note 191, at 219. 
204  See Ruth S. Cowan, Aspects of the History of Prenatal Diagnosis, 8 FETAL 
DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 10, 11–14 (1993) (discussing the history of amniocentesis and 
chorionic villus sampling). 
205  See James R. Sorenson & Dorothy C. Wertz, Couple Agreement Before and After 
Genetic Counseling, 25 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 549, 553–54 (1986) (suggesting that most 
couples confront disagreement with respect to reproductive plans). 
206  See Peter G. Pryde et al., Prenatal Diagnosis: Choices Women Make About 
Pursuing Testing and Acting on Abnormal Results, 36 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 496, 503 (1993). 
207  See Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs 
and Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 41–44 (1991). 
208  See Amy S. Kaiser et al., The Effects of Prenatal Group Genetic Counselling on 
Knowledge, Anxiety and Decisional Conflict: Issues for Nuchal Translucency Screening, 
22 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 246, 252 (2002) (concluding that anxiety metrics among 
those studied did not change significantly before counseling compared with after 
counseling). 
209  See Ralph L. Kramer et al., Determinants of Parental Decisions After the Prenatal 
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, 79 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 172, 174 (1998) (determining that 
surveyed patients who chose abortion following a positive fetal test for Down syndrome 
tended to be older and earlier in their pregnancy than those electing to continue their 
pregnancy). 
210  See Rita B. Black, Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Loss: Psychosocial 
Consequences and Professional Responsibilities, 35 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 586, 587 
(1990). 
211  Before prenatal testing, information about congenital disability in reproductive 
decision making was limited to carrier screening, which cannot diagnose particular defects 
in prenatal lives, but only identify recessive genes that would place individuals at an 
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fetal testing technique is amniocentesis.212 First developed in the 1950s, the 
procedure became routine by the 1970s, and since then it has undergone no 
significant technical refinements.213 Just as in the 1970s, amniocentesis is currently 
performed in the second trimester of pregnancy, at sixteen to eighteen weeks into 
the gestation period.214 The procedure involves the insertion of a hollow needle 
through the abdomen of a pregnant woman to remove a sample of the amniotic 
fluid surrounding the developing fetus.215 The fluid contains fetal cells that can be 
examined to determine fetal sex, the number of cellular chromosomes, and specific 
genetic disorders.216 The risk of fetal loss, approximately 0.5 percent, has remained 
roughly constant since the 1970s.217 
Another diagnostic procedure, chorionic villus sampling (CVS), was 
introduced in the early 1980s.218 In CVS, a small tube is inserted through the 
vagina and cervix and into the placenta, from which a small amount of tissue is 
removed.219 CVS can be performed several weeks earlier than amniocentesis, but it 
poses a higher risk of fetal loss, namely about 1 percent.220 CVS has advanced little 
in technical precision, invasiveness, or risk, however, since its pre-ADA 
inception,221 decreasing the likelihood that the advent of this procedure had a 
significant impact on amniocentesis or selective abortion rates in the mid-1990s.222 
Similarly, a prenatal technique called the triple screen,223 a maternal blood 
                                                                                                                            
increased risk of having a child born with a disability. RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, 
HEREDITY AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR GENETIC SCREENING 10 (2008). 
212  See R. Douglas Wilson, Amniocentesis and Chorionic Villus Sampling, 12 
CURRENT OPINION IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81, 81 (2000) (“Invasive prenatal 
diagnosis continues to be the gold standard for pregnancies.”). 
213  See COMMITTEE ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 76 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). 
214  See Jane E. Brody, Experts Explore Safer Tests for Down Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2001, at F6. 
215  See Andrews et al., supra note 213, at 83. 
216  See id. 
217  See id. 
218  See M.J.J. Vekemans & Tracy B. Perry, Cytogenetic Analysis of Chorionic Villi: 
A Technical Assessment, 72 HUM. GENETICS 307, 307 (1986). 
219  See id.  
220  See ELENA O. NIGHTINGALE & MELISSA GOODMAN, BEFORE BIRTH: PRENATAL 
TESTING FOR GENETIC DISEASE 35–36 (1990) (noting that the risk of miscarriage from this 
procedure is about the same as amniocentesis). 
221  See THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2146 (Mark H. Beers et 
al. eds., 18th ed. 2006). 
222  Boaz Weisz & Charles H. Rodeck, An Update on Antenatal Screening for Down’s 
Syndrome and Specific Implications for Assisted Reproduction Pregnancies, 12 HUM. 
REPRODUCTION UPDATE 513, 518 (2006). Moreover, testing for the effects of CVS on 
disability-selective abortion—as done with amniocentesis—is not possible due to the lack 
of information on the test in the U.S. natality data. 
223  This test is also known as the Triple Test, Multiple Marker Screening, or AFP 
Plus. See Triple Screen Test, American Pregnancy Association, http://www.american 
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screening test for fetal levels of alpha-fetoprotein protein, estriol hormone, and 
human chorionic gonadotropin hormone,224 had gained widespread use by the late-
1990s, but it was not generally available in U.S. hospitals before 1998.225 It 
therefore seems unlikely that technological advances in diagnostic procedures can 
explain significant changes in reproductive decision making during the years 
between 1992 and 1998. 
Legal changes may seem like a more plausible candidate, but reproduction 
law likewise saw few significant changes during the mid-1990s.226 Informed-
consent laws and public funding of prenatal testing could have a range of plausible 
medical, material, and economic consequences tending to influence reproductive 
decision making. These factors may affect the availability of genetic testing 
providers, the required waiting period for genetic testing services, the delivery of 
genetic information to prospective parents by physicians and counselors, and the 
ability to pay for prenatal diagnosis.227 While amniocentesis is expensive, at a cost 
of a little more than $1,000 in the early 1990s,228 most insurance plans covered 
prenatal tests long before the enactment of the ADA, especially for women older 
than thirty-five.229 
In the years between 1990 and 1992, up to and until the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the abortion right in Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,230 a small number of states passed laws making abortion more accessible or 
less expensive when the parent wished to avoid having a child with a disability. In 
the early 1990s, Maryland,231 Kansas,232 Texas,233 and Utah234 enacted statutes 
                                                                                                                            
pregnancy.org/prenataltesting/tripletest.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
224  See Laurence A. Cole et al., Hyperglycosylated Human Chorionic Gonadotropin 
(Invasive Trophoblast Antigen) Immunoassay: A New Basis for Gestational Down 
Syndrome Screening, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 2109, 2109 (1999). 
225  See George J. Knight et al., Integrated Serum Screening for Down Syndrome in 
Primary Obstetric Practice, 25 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1162, 1162 (2005). 
226  See Martha A. Field, Killing “The Handicapped”—Before and After Birth, 16 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 110–113 (1993). 
227  See Clayton, supra note 191, at 177. 
228  See Paul S. Heckerling & Marion S. Verp, A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of 
Amniocentesis and Chorionic Villus Sampling for Prenatal Genetic Testing, 32 MED. CARE 
863, 867 (1994) (combining cost of counseling, ultrasound, procedure, and cytogenetic 
analyses for amniocentesis). 
229  See generally J.P. Moatti et al., Socio-cultural Inequities in Access to Prenatal 
Diagnosis: The Role of Insurance Coverage and Regulatory Policies, 10 PRENATAL 
DIAGNOSIS 313, 315 (1990) (stating the majority of women in the study had amniocentesis 
covered by some type of insurance). 
230  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
231  Maryland permitted abortion until twenty-six weeks’ gestation if “[t]here is 
substantial risk of the birth of the child with grave and permanent physical deformity or 
mental retardation.” MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-208 (1991). 
232  Kansas permitted abortion in the third-trimester if “there is substantial risk . . . that 
the child would be born with physical or mental defect.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3407 
(1991). 
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permitting late-term abortion only on narrow grounds, including diagnosis of fetal 
disability. During those same years, Washington,235 Minnesota,236 and California237 
passed laws subsidizing prenatal tests. Tennessee,238 Iowa,239 and Maryland240 fund 
abortions to prevent disability but not for other reasons. Among reproductive laws 
passed before 1992 that affect parents’ decisions to undergo prenatal testing or to 
continue a pregnancy following a positive test for fetal disability, few statutes have 
since been repealed or substantially amended, and few similar laws were enacted 
before 2000.241 
A plausible legal influence on selective abortion is the Family Medical Leave 
Act of 1993 (FMLA), which requires employers for most of the nation’s workers 
to provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave of absence to care for the birth of a 
child, among other familial needs.242 Some might speculate that the FMLA’s 
protections for women in the workforce could incentivize having children at an 
earlier age and that resulting changes in maternal age patterns could in turn affect 
                                                                                                                            
233  Texas permitted abortion after viability if the fetus “has a severe and irreversible 
abnormality, as identified through reliable diagnostic procedures.” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 44956 (1991). 
234  Utah permitted abortion in the final term “if the unborn child would be born with 
grave defects.” UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301-317.1 (1992). 
235  Washington required insurers who provide maternity benefits to include prenatal 
tests within the benefits package. Washington also required maternity benefits to include 
prenatal tests. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.344 (1990) (group health care services 
contract to cover prenatal diagnosis); Id. § 48.46.375 (1990) (HMOs to cover prenatal 
diagnosis). 
236  Minnesota also required maternity benefits to include prenatal tests. See 1991 
MINN. CH. LAWS 33, § 36 (some insurance benefits to cover prenatal diagnosis) (codified at 
MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 62K).  
237  California also required maternity benefits to include prenatal tests. See CAL. INS. 
CODE § 10123.9 (1991) (group policy coverage of prenatal diagnosis); id. § 11512.18 
(1991) (nonprofit hospital service plan coverage of prenatal diagnosis).  
238  Tennessee gave public funding for abortion in cases where the fetus is “medically 
determined to have severe physical deformities or abnormalities or severe mental 
retardation” 1992 TENN. PUB. ACTS 1018, § 10, Item 4(3).  
239  Iowa funded abortion when the “fetus is physically deformed, mentally deficient, 
or afflicted with a congenital illness.” 1991 IOWA ACTS 267, §§ 103, b & 210, o(2).  
240  Maryland subsidized abortion to avoid “congenital defect or serious deformity or 
abnormality.” 1992 MD. LAWS 64, § 1, 32.17.01.02. 
241  See Senator Jackie Speier Promotes New State Law to Save Lives and Prevent 
Birth Defects, CALIF. CHRON., Oct. 31, 2006, at A8. But cf. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the 
Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 
1706–96 (2008) (discussing abortion bans on the South Dakota ballot in 2006 and 2008, 
and recent informed consent restrictions in other states). 
242  During the leave period, health insurance coverage must be continued and the 
employee must be restored to his or her original position upon return. See Family Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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rates of fetal testing and termination.243 The FMLA offers no special provisions for 
children with disabilities, however, and natality data indicate that average maternal 
age is, at any rate, a statistically insignificant predictor of Down syndrome 
birthrates,244 making the FMLA an unlikely influence on disability-selective 
abortion rates in the 1990s. 
Some states recognize “wrongful life” or “wrongful birth” torts, which might 
be thought to influence parental decisions to continue a pregnancy following 
prenatal testing for Down syndrome.245 In three states—California,246 New 
Jersey,247 and Washington248—a child born with a serious genetic disability may 
sue a physician if its parents show that they would have aborted had they been 
informed of the potential disability.249 In these lawsuits, genetic professionals can 
be held liable for birth defects if physicians or counselors did not meet the standard 
                                                 
243  See, e.g., Pinka Chatterji & Sara Markowitz, Does the Length of Maternity Leave 
Affect Maternal Health?, 72 S. ECON. J. 16, 17–38 (2005) (examining the impact of the 
length of maternity leave on maternal health). 
244  See infra tbl.1. 
245  Malpractice claims for wrongful life and wrongful birth are more common than 
claims for failure to inform of the risk of miscarriage from amniocentesis. See Wendy 
Fritzen Hensel, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 151 (2005). This is likely due to the care 
with which testing providers characteristically discuss and document the details and risks 
of amniocentesis with their patients. See, e.g., Bedel v. Univ. of Cinn. Hosp., 669 N.E.2d 9, 
13–16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the dismissal of an informed consent action 
alleging a physician’s failure to disclose the risks of miscarriage attending amniocentesis 
because the patient was verbally informed of the risk and signed three consent forms). 
Causes of action for misdiagnosing prenatal genetic disorder are also uncommon. See, e.g., 
Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538, 538–39 (N.Y. 1987) 
(reversing the lower court’s dismissal of a claim for emotional distress against a physician 
for incorrectly diagnosing a fetal brain abnormality and reasoning that the plaintiff’s 
decision to terminate the pregnancy caused her psychological injury flowing from her 
belief that abortion is a sin except in unusual circumstances). 
246  See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) 
(reasoning that disability-selective abortion is a desirable means of reducing the 
“increasingly large part of the overall health care burden” represented by children with 
congenital disabilities (quoting Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability 
of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1496, 1499 (1978)). 
The Curlender court acknowledged in dicta that its reasoning would support a cause of 
action by a seriously disabled child against his parents for choosing to bring him into the 
world. Id. at 487–89. If parents make a conscious and informed choice to carry a seriously 
disabled child to term, the majority reasoned, nothing should “protect [them] from being 
answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their 
offspring.” Id. at 488. 
247  See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984). 
248  See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983). 
249  The “adequate disclosure” requirement in medical informed consent law was 
established in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (involving a 
physician who failed to warn his patient of a risk of paralysis that could result from back 
surgery). 
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of care in offering prenatal testing to a high-risk patient, if they failed to diagnose a 
detectable defect through prenatal testing, or if they failed to inform the patient 
about a detected defect.250 Success in such suits requires parents to prove that they 
would have terminated the pregnancy had they learned of the genetic disorder in 
time to abort.251 In 2007, a Florida couple was awarded $21 million after a 
physician failed to prenatally diagnose their son with Smith-Lemli-Opitz 
syndrome, an obscure congenital disorder that inhibits the production of 
cholesterol.252 Recognition of such suits could affect reproductive decision making 
to the extent that expected liability encourages physicians to endorse prenatal 
testing more often. However, all such state tort law has been on the books since 
before 1985,253 so it is unlikely this would have had a large effect on reproductive 
decision making in the 1990s. 
No federal agency weighed in on the practice of genetic testing between 1982 
and 2007. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 
which receives federal funds from the National Institutes of Health,254 released a 
technical bulletin in 1982 stating that “routine maternal serum prenatal screening 
of all [pregnant women] is of uncertain value.”255 Maternal serum screening is 
indeed a prenatal diagnostic technique with limited predictive capability.256 While 
the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of maternal serum screening 
for neural tube defects in 1983,257 it has never approved the use of that particular 
procedure to screen prenatally for Down syndrome.258 The ACOG prominently 
                                                 
250  See James Coplan, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: New Concepts for the 
Pediatrician, 75 PEDIATRICS 65, 68 (1985). 
251  See id.  
252  See Fla. Couple Wins $21 Million in ‘Wrongful Birth’ Suit, FOXNEWS, July 24, 
2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,290570,00.html. 
253  See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760–63 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson, 656 
P.2d at 487–95; Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980). 
254  See David Korn, Data on NIH Funding to Medical School Departments Years 
1984–1997, COUNCIL OF ACADEMIC SOCIETIES MEMORANDUM (Aug. 3, 1998). 
255  See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Technical 
Bulletin No. 67, Prenatal Detection of Neural Tube Defects (1982). ACOG claimed that in 
the absence of high-quality laboratory, counseling, ultrasound, and amniocentesis services, 
the procedure “could simply increase cost and parental anxiety . . . and possibly lead to 
unnecessary abortions.” See id. 
256  James E. Haddow et al., Prenatal Screening for Down’s Syndrome with Use of 
Maternal Serum Markers, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 588, 588–93 (1992) [hereinafter Haddow 
et al., Prenatal Screening]. The procedure consists of measuring four chemical markers 
present in a pregnant woman’s blood, abnormal levels of which may indicate increased risk 
for certain birth defects and genetic diseases. See James E. Haddow et al., Screening of 
Maternal Serum for Fetal Down’s Syndrome in the First Trimester, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
955, 955 (1998) [hereinafter Haddow et al., Screening of Maternal Serum]. 
257  James L. Mills & Lucinda England, Food Fortification To Prevent Neural Tube 
Defects: Is It Working?, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3022, 3022 (2001). 
258  See Haddow et al., Prenatal Screening, supra note 256, at 588. 
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revisited the issue of prenatal testing for fetal disability in December 2007, when 
the organization recommended that hospitals and physicians be required to expand 
their offer of prenatal testing for Down syndrome and other common genetic 
disorders to pregnant women of all ages, not just to those thirty-five and older.259 
While these most recent ACOG recommendations are very likely to influence 
amniocentesis and selective abortion rates in the future, their release in 2007 
makes it implausible that they would have affected parental decision making 
during the period from 1992 to 2002. 
The legal doctrine of informed consent could have influenced testing and 
abortion rates, insofar as it affects the delivery of genetic information to 
prospective parents by physicians and counselors.260 A seminal medical ethics 
textbook notes that the “primary justification advanced for requirements of 
informed consent has been to protect autonomous choice.”261 Guided by the 
principle of autonomy, universities began offering degree programs in genetic 
counseling.262 These courses were designed to help aspiring professionals educate 
patients about their genetic risks and testing options and to assist prospective 
                                                 
259  See Press Release, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, New 
Recommendations for Down Syndrome: Screening Should Be Offered to All Pregnant 
Women (Jan. 2, 2007), available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/ 
press_releases/nr01-02-07-1.cfm; see also ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88: Invasive 
Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1459, 1465 (2007). The 
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee responded by proposing 
legislation that would require prospective parents who receive a diagnosis of Down 
syndrome or any other genetic condition be provided with information about the condition 
as well as support services and networks that offer assistance in raising a child with the 
condition. See Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act of 2008, S. 
1810, 110th Cong. § 2(1) (“It is the purpose of this Act to . . . increase patient referrals to 
providers of key support services for women who have received a positive diagnosis for 
Down syndrome, or other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed conditions, as well as to 
provide up-to-date information on the range of outcomes for individuals living with the 
diagnosed condition, including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial 
outcomes . . . .”). The final bill, signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 
8, 2008, provides for the establishment of “resource telephone hotlines” and “a national 
registry, or network of local registries, of families willing to adopt newborns with Down 
syndrome . . . .” Id. § 3(b)(1)(B)(i), (iv). The law importantly requires health care providers 
receiving grants and other funds from the federal government to offer “[u]p-to-date, 
evidence-based, written information concerning the range of outcomes for individuals 
living with the diagnosed condition” and “[c]ontact information regarding support 
services” such as the hotlines established in § 3(b)(1)(B)(i) and educational programs at the 
national and local levels. Id. § 3(c)(1)(A)–(B).   
260  See Susan J. Hayflick & M. Patrice Eiff, Role of Primary Care Providers in the 
Delivery of Genetics Services, 1 COMMUNITY GENETICS 18, 20 (1998) (explaining that 
genetic counselors begin by obtaining information including family history, medical 
history, and pregnancy history). 
261  TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
77 (5th ed. 2001). 
262  Id. 
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parents in making reproductive decisions consistent with their values and goals.263 
Since its inception, the field of genetic counseling has sought to distinguish its 
ideals from those of twentieth-century eugenics.264 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the profession quickly adopted a nondirective approach that rejects specific 
recommendations in favor of a balanced and impartial presentation of all relevant 
information.265 Yet neither the professional ideals of genetic counseling nor the 
legal principle of informed consent has undergone significant changes over the 
past quarter century.266 The basic goal of nondirectiveness has not changed since 
the 1980s.267 
The foregoing discussion suggests that legal, economic, medical, and 
technological factors cannot plausibly account for the large changes in Down 
syndrome birthrates observed during the 1990s.268 We cannot, of course, rule out 
these alternative explanations in the absence of considerably more rigorous 
research and analysis. Moreover, it may be that the social attitudes underlying 
changes in state reproductive laws themselves contributed to an increase in 
termination rates. One plausible explanation, however, is the “disappointing ADA” 
account we presented in Part III. We hypothesized that the ADA, through its 
influence on social interaction and media coverage, reinforced negative affective 
attitudes toward people with disabilities in general and toward those with Down 
syndrome in particular.269 
We have not attempted to prove that any specific mechanism causally links 
the ADA to declining birthrates among children with Down syndrome. We have 
argued that two accounts of expressive externalities merit further investigation. 
The first is the ADA’s influence on increased interpersonal contact with people 
with disabilities. The second is the media’s framing of stories about people with 
disabilities. Our quantitative and qualitative results suggest that the ADA, as 
filtered through complex social networks and the media, may have contributed to 
the decline in Down syndrome birthrates from 1993 to 1998.270 
                                                 
263  See Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Patient Autonomy and Value-
Neutrality in Nondirective Genetic Counseling, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104 (1995). 
264  See Seymour Kessler, The Psychological Paradigm Shift in Genetic Counseling, 
27 SOC. BIOLOGY 167, 168, 182 (1980) (discussing the shift from a genetic counseling 
model focusing on managing human heredity to the current model focusing on helping 
patients resolve problems and make decisions). 
265  See Sonia M. Suter, Value Neutrality and Nondirectiveness: Comments on 
“Future Directions in Genetic Counseling,” 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 161, 162 (1998). 
266  See H.H. Chiang et al., Informed Choice of Pregnant Women in Prenatal 
Screening Tests for Down’s Syndrome, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 273, 274 (2006). 
267  See Beth A. Fine, The Evolution of Nondirectiveness in Genetic Counseling and 
Implications of the Human Genome Project, in PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE: ETHICAL 
CHALLENGES IN GENETIC COUNSELING 101, 105–06 (Dianne M. Bartels et al. eds., 1993). 
268  See supra Part V.B.I. 
269  See supra Part IV.B. 
270  See supra Part V.B.I. 
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We suggest that policymakers supplement the passage of certain civil rights 
laws with public education campaigns on behalf of the protected group in question. 
Where reproductive practices are affected, physicians should refer parents who 
receive an unexpected diagnosis to resources such as local support groups, national 
disability organizations, and parents who have children with disabilities.  Future 
research might apply our expressive approach to explore the impact civil rights 
laws protecting women or homosexuals may have had on the incidence of prenatal 
selection based on sex or sexual orientation. Other studies might consider the 
expressive effects of antidiscrimination or immigration law on the rate at which 
biological parents place particular groups of children up for adoption, or the rate at 
which parents choose to adopt these children over others once they enter state 
custody. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has considered whether, why, and how the Americans with 
Disabilities Act influenced the birthrate of infants with Down syndrome. Part II 
drew on expressive law theory to explain the connection between the ADA, social 
attitudes toward people with disabilities, and the practice of disability-selective 
abortion. We introduced the concept of expressive externalities to capture the 
social cost of legal actions unrelated to behavior the law was designed to regulate. 
Part III presented competing hypotheses of the ADA’s expressive effects for 
disability-selective abortion. The first hypothesis—what we called “the uplifting 
ADA”—suggests that the ADA encouraged parents to bring fetuses with Down 
syndrome to term by promoting new rights and opportunities for people with 
disabilities. The second hypothesis—“the disappointing ADA”—conjectured that 
the ADA paradoxically might have promoted disability-selective abortion if social 
interactions reinforced negative attitudes toward people with disabilities or if the 
media portrayed people with disabilities as incurring undesirable costs for society. 
The econometric analysis in Part IV showed that Down syndrome birthrates 
decreased significantly and steadily from 1993 to 1998. The decline of 13 to 18 
Down syndrome births per 100,000 was robust, even with the inclusion of 
demographic and health-related control variables and against the backdrop of 
highly stable prenatal screening rates. We did not find supportive evidence for a 
similar effect among infants with spina bifida and cleft palate. Part IV provided 
support for our argument about the expressivist effects of the ADA on Down-
selective abortion, by accounting for variables related to technology, law, and 
medicine. 
These conclusions yield important implications for reproduction and 
antidiscrimination law. First, we should be clear that we do not believe our 
findings justify restrictions on a woman’s constitutional right to terminate a 
pregnancy for any reason, at least until the third trimester.271 One reason not to 
                                                 
271 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843–53 (1992) 
(reaffirming the holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
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restrict abortions that are sought for particular purposes is that such prohibition 
carries costs that may outweigh any benefits of prevention. For example, attempts 
to criminalize disability-selective abortion could authorize easily abused inquiries 
into the legitimate reasons that women have for seeking abortions.272 This is 
important because a woman’s right to avoid the obligations and expectations that 
attend childbearing and childrearing is properly protected as a matter of moral and 
legal equality.273 The short-term effects we observe on disability-selective abortion 
nevertheless may give reason to advance public education campaigns274 to correct 
misleading social perceptions about the eight components of the disability-based 
reproductive utility function.275  
Our expressive approach for analyzing the effects of disability law on social 
attitudes and reproductive behavior has fruitful and straightforward applications 
for other inquiries. Promising areas for additional research include adoption on the 
basis of race or disability, and prenatal selection for sex or for sexual orientation 
(to the extent that sexual orientation has a genetic basis).276 Future studies might 
investigate whether expressive externalities increase the rate at which biological 
parents place children with disabilities up for adoption, or whether expressive 
externalities decrease the rate at which adoptive parents choose to raise such 
children. Related projects might explore whether the second wave feminist 
movement had any impact on sex selection, or how the evolving legal and social 
                                                 
272  See Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 
18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 933, 937 (1984). 
273  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57–59 (1977); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 
N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–83 (1985); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality 
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311–24 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: 
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 261, 347–80 (1992). 
274  See Heidi Zhou, Doctors Urged to Rethink Options after Prenatal Down 
Syndrome Diagnosis, NEWS 8 AUSTIN, Oct. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.news8austin.com/content/headlines/?ArID=193564&SecID=2 (discussing a 
campaign to educate health workers that was launched by the Down Syndrome Association 
of Central Texas).  
275  See supra Part III.C. 
276  A team of scientists at the National Institutes of Health reported discovering a 
“statistically significant correlation between the inheritance of genetic markers . . . and 
sexual orientation in a selected group of homosexual males.” Dean H. Hamer et al., A 
Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 
SCIENCE 321, 321 (1993); see also Ivanka Savic & Per Lindström, PET and MRI Show 
Differences in Cerebral Asymmetry and Functional Connectivity Between Homo- and 
Heterosexual Subjects, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9403, 9407 (finding that homosexual 
and heterosexual orientation appear to be linked to genetic brain structures rather than 
factors after birth). 
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status of homosexuals could influence selective abortion on the basis of sexual 
orientation, if such techniques became possible.277 
Selective adoption patterns offer a fresh look at the impact of disability law on 
decisions to raise children with disabilities. A measurable increase in the rate at 
which children with disabilities are put up for adoption would presumably indicate 
that parents are less willing to rear them. Similarly, if adoptive parents tend to 
select healthy children over similarly situated children with disabilities, we would 
observe an ex post version of the fertility decisions examined between 1989 and 
2002. Variation in preferences for male versus female children across countries 
and cultures is well-documented.278 In the last decade, fertility clinics have 
embraced a new technology that permits parents to choose a boy or girl prior to 
fertilization.279 This process, known as MicroSort, enjoys a 74 percent and 88 
percent success rate in producing boys and girls, respectively.280 Expressive 
externalities could stimulate demand for one sex over the other if changes in law 
bring about changes in the relative value parents ascribe to male and female 
children. Even greater expressive externalities could attend the widespread passage 
of gay marriage laws in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas.281 
This Article has explored the surprising ways that antidiscrimination law can 
change social behavior in spheres completely unrelated to those that the law 
regulates. We puzzled through this phenomenon by considering the relation 
between the Americans with Disabilities Act and selective abortion following a 
positive test for Down syndrome. We examined the paradoxical possibility that the 
ADA could have served to prevent the existence of people with disabilities, the 
very class of persons the law was meant to protect. Our analysis does not indict the 
ADA or antidiscrimination law generally. Instead, we have called attention to the 
way that antidiscrimination law can, at least in the short-term, transform social 
interaction and media portrayals in ways that reinforce “society’s accumulated 
myths and fears about disability and disease.”282 As the Nobel Prize-winning 
economist who popularized the concept of externalities observed almost fifty years 
ago: 
 
                                                 
277 Jonathan Tolins’s recent, acclaimed Broadway production The Twilight of the 
Golds imagines a world in which fetuses can be screened for sexual orientation. Jonathan 
Tolins, The Twilight of the Golds, in THE LAST SUNDAY IN JUNE AND OTHER PLAYS 103 
(2004). 
278  See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis 
and Sex Selection, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 24 (1989); John A. Robertson, 
Preconception Gender Selection, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 2 (2001). 
279  See Keith L. Blauer, Human Sperm Sorting Method is Showing Success at 
Separating the Girls from the Boys, 16 GENETICS & IVF INST. NEWSL. 2 (2002). 
280  See MicroSort Gender Selection, http://www.microsort.com (last visited Sept. 1, 
2009). 
281  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
282  Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
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[I]n choosing between social arrangements within the context of which 
individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that a change in 
the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions 
may well lead to a worsening of others.283  
 
Heeding Coase’s insight does not mean that antidiscrimination law—or any other 
legal provision—will necessarily generate controversial trade-offs. Our analysis 
suggests, however, that we would do well to contemplate the attitudinal and 
behavioral changes implicated by major legal changes. Our growing power over 
genetic testing and reproductive biotechnology gives special reason to attend to 
such collateral effects. Accounting for expressive externalities can enhance our 
understanding of the complex ways that people make decisions and help secure the 
promise of civil rights and self-respect for those in need of the law’s protection. 
                                                 
283  Coase, supra note 75, at 44. 
2009] DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION AND THE ADA 897 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (1989–2002) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Down syndrome births (per 100,000) 52.20 24.57 
Spina bifida births (per 100,000) 25.48 15.79 
White mothers (%) 79.67 15.65 
Married mothers (%) 69.08 7.66 
College-educated mothers (%) 21.64 6.34 
Mother’s age at birth 26.71 1.03 
Birth order (including newborn child) 2.02 0.11 
Births subject to amniocentesis (%) 2.91 1.56 
Number of prenatal visits 11.35 0.69 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The summary statistics are derived from the set of state-year observations 
such that N = 714. 
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Table 2: Estimated Annual Changes in Down Syndrome Birthrates  
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 -3.69 (3.19) 
-4.93 
(3.34) 
-3.67 
(3.20) 
-5.17 
(3.19) 
1992 -3.80 (2.77) 
-5.96 
(3.95) 
-4.00 
(2.81) 
-6.57 
(3.69) 
1993 -8.80
** 
(3.79) 
–11.72** 
(4.72) 
-9.24** 
(3.96) 
–13.33*** 
(4.64) 
1994 -8.16
** 
(3.54) 
–11.46 
(6.26) 
-9.21** 
(3.88) 
–14.39** 
(6.21) 
1995 –11.00
*** 
(3.99) 
–14.36** 
(6.33) 
–12.46*** 
(4.29) 
–18.21*** 
(6.09) 
1996 -6.24 (3.75) 
–10.25 
(6.79) 
-7.45 
(3.82) 
–13.76** 
(6.22) 
1997 -9.92
** 
(4.00) 
–14.80** 
(7.22) 
–10.47** 
(4.42) 
–17.67** 
(6.67) 
1998 –10.32
*** 
(3.71) 
–15.62** 
(7.48) 
-9.94** 
(4.40) 
–17.51** 
(7.21) 
1999 -7.69
** 
(3.95) 
–13.47 
(8.40) 
-6.59 
(4.93) 
–14.93 
(8.05) 
2000 –1.41 (3.85) 
-8.23 
(9.23) 
0.84 
(4.94) 
-8.61 
(9.11) 
2001 -5.24 (3.48) 
–12.50 
(9.79) 
-2.15 
(5.08) 
–12.01 
(9.51) 
2002 -4.10 (3.70) 
–11.97 
(10.04) 
-0.11 
(5.36) 
–10.88 
(9.73) 
Demographic  
Controls? No Yes No Yes 
Health  
Controls? No No Yes Yes 
N 714 714 714 714 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with Down syndrome in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 
include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Demographic controls include: (a) average age at childbirth of mother in state s, 
year t; (b) share of women who are white giving birth in state s, year t; (c) share of 
women with some college education or less, at childbirth in state s, year t; and (d) 
share of married women at childbirth in state s, year t. Medical and health controls 
include: (a) average live birth order (including the current birth) in state s, year t; 
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(b) average number of prenatal visits in state s, year t; and (c) share of live births 
subject to amniocentesis in state s, year t. ** = significance at the 5% level and *** 
= significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2 (Cont.): Estimated Annual Changes in Down Syndrome Birthrates 
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average Maternal 
Age - 
6.18 
(6.29)  
9.14 
(6.70) 
Percentage Married - -8.79 (49.56)  
-24.60 
(52.19) 
Percentage White - -141.26
** 
(58.01)  
-156.79*** 
(55.42) 
Share with College 
Education - 
11.05 
(83.60)  
-3.63 
(73.39) 
Average Birth Order -  -41.76 (23.58) 
-71.03*** 
(25.26) 
Average Number of 
Prenatal Visits -  
2.02 
(3.12) 
2.77 
(3.17) 
Share using 
Amniocentesis -  
312.95 
(170.21) 
252.07 
(180.87) 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with Down syndrome in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 
include state fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
** = significance at the 5% level and *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Estimated Annual Changes in Spina Bifida Birthrates  
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 -1.97 (1.64) 
-1.03 
(1.94) 
-1.78 
(1.63) 
-1.27 
(1.93) 
1992 -2.38 (2.77) 
-0.15 
(2.83) 
-2.01 
(2.87) 
-0.48 
(2.77) 
1993 2.04 (2.76) 
5.34 
(3.21) 
2.48 
(2.94) 
5.11 
(3.25) 
1994 -0.74 (2.01) 
3.83 
(3.61) 
-0.42 
(2.16) 
3.45 
(3.83) 
1995 2.23 (2.14) 
8.15 
(3.96) 
2.59 
(2.57) 
7.89 
(4.11) 
1996 0.73 (2.55) 
7.56 
(4.25) 
1.33 
(2.79) 
7.32 
(4.50) 
1997 -2.88 (2.61) 
4.51 
(4.48) 
-1.62 
(2.94) 
4.89 
(4.71) 
1998 -6.93
*** 
(2.31) 
0.92 
(4.48) 
-5.07 
(2.58) 
1.80 
(4.52) 
1999 -5.36 (2.75) 
3.18 
(4.80) 
-2.98 
(3.42) 
4.71 
(4.83) 
2000 -4.48 (2.36) 
4.52 
(5.04) 
-1.39 
(3.22) 
6.82 
(5.12) 
2001 -5.03 (2.83) 
4.74 
(5.05) 
-1.45 
(3.62) 
7.48 
(4.99) 
2002 -5.16
** 
(2.40) 
5.49 
(5.49) 
-0.96 
(3.50) 
8.90 
(5.64) 
Demographic  
Controls? No Yes No Yes 
Health  
Controls? No No Yes Yes 
N 714 714 714 714 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with spina bifida in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 include 
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Demographic controls include: (a) average age at childbirth of mother in state s, 
year t; (b) share of women who are white giving birth in state s, year t; (c) share of 
women with some college education or less, at childbirth in state s, year t; and (d) 
share of married women at childbirth in state s, year t. Medical and health controls 
include: (a) average live birth order (including the current birth) in state s, year t; 
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(b) average number of prenatal visits in state s, year t; and (c) share of live births 
subject to amniocentesis in state s, year t. ** = significance at the 5% level and *** 
= significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3 (Cont.): Estimated Annual Changes in Spina Bifida Birthrates  
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average Maternal 
Age - 
-4.45 
(3.83)  
-5.28 
(5.82) 
Percentage Married - 16.99 (52.16)  
1.95 
(52.74) 
Percentage White - -46.44 (35.24)  
-33.63 
(33.80) 
Share with College 
Education - 
-62.95 
(33.79)  
-60.58 
(34.89) 
Average Birth Order -  -30.23 (18.25) 
-16.79 
(23.46) 
Average Number of 
Prenatal Visits -  
-1.95 
(2.34) 
-0.95 
(2.59) 
Share using 
Amniocentesis -  
218.52 
(133.54) 
261.18** 
(112.21) 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with spina bifida in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 include 
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. ** = 
significance at the 5% level and *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Estimated Annual Changes in Cleft Palate Birthrates  
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 -2.26 (4.10) 
0.35 
(4.17) 
-2.21 
(4.04) 
0.14 
(3.89) 
1992 -6.60 (4.11) 
-2.44 
(5.43) 
-6.71 
(4.27) 
-2.92 
(5.30) 
1993 -0.07 (4.02) 
5.77 
(5.96) 
-0.09 
(4.18) 
5.52 
(6.19) 
1994 1.25 (4.35) 
9.13 
(7.52) 
0.79 
(5.31) 
8.53 
(7.83) 
1995 -2.83 (4.76) 
6.46 
(7.66) 
-3.39 
(5.70) 
5.91 
(8.15) 
1996 0.30 (5.11) 
10.72 
(9.60) 
0.02 
(6.08) 
10.45 
(10.02) 
1997 -2.57 (5.48) 
7.90 
(8.94) 
-1.59 
(6.71) 
8.84 
(9.14) 
1998 -2.95 (4.50) 
8.34 
(9.21) 
-0.51 
(5.90) 
10.66 
(9.56) 
1999 -7.15 (4.49) 
4.77 
(9.22) 
-3.30 
(6.82) 
8.63 
(9.57) 
2000 -3.94 (4.71) 
8.04 
(10.55) 
1.71 
(7.08) 
13.88 
(11.18) 
2001 -3.13 (4.92) 
9.83 
(10.63) 
3.77 
(7.33) 
17.08 
(10.88) 
2002 -2.18 (5.14) 
11.88 
(12.56) 
6.33 
(7.75) 
20.90 
(12.98) 
Demographic  
Controls? No Yes No Yes 
Health  
Controls? No No Yes Yes 
N 714 714 714 714 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with cleft palate in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 include 
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Demographic controls include: (a) average age at childbirth of mother in state s, 
year t; (b) share of women who are white giving birth in state s, year t; (c) share of 
women with some college education or less, at childbirth in state s, year t; and (d) 
share of married women at childbirth in state s, year t. Medical and health controls 
include: (a) average live birth order (including the current birth) in state s, year t; 
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(b) average number of prenatal visits in state s, year t; and (c) share of live births 
subject to amniocentesis in state s, year t. ** = significance at the 5% level and *** 
= significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4 (Cont.): Estimated Annual Changes in Cleft Palate Birthrates  
(1989–2002) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average Maternal 
Age - 
-1.62 
(7.65)  
-5.65 
(10.51) 
Percentage Married - 119.71 (85.74)  
109.21 
(98.74) 
Percentage White - -138.50
** 
(66.94)  
-136.38** 
(67.50) 
Share with College 
Education - 
-46.68 
(97.44)  
-36.59 
(99.81) 
Average Birth Order -  -54.16 (40.94) 
-41.22 
(47.29) 
Average Number of 
Prenatal Visits -  
-0.26 
(4.36) 
2.46 
(5.03) 
Share using 
Amniocentesis -  
584.71** 
(243.03) 
589.23** 
(248.52) 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with cleft palate in each state and year. All regressions except Column 1 include 
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. ** = 
significance at the 5% level and *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Annual Changes in Down Syndrome Birthrates by Maternal Age 
(1989–2002) 
 
 Under 35 At least 35 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 -6.15
** 
(2.51) 
-6.73** 
(2.85) 
12.60 
(18.28) 
8.81 
(19.82) 
1992 -4.94 (2.89) 
-6.42 
(4.03) 
-7.99 
(14.73) 
-13.93 
(20.49) 
1993 -11.32
*** 
(3.31) 
-13.61*** 
(4.50) 
-4.16 
(13.97) 
-11.87 
(21.48) 
1994 -12.20
*** 
(3.29) 
-15.42** 
(5.92) 
-3.64 
(13.58) 
-11.64 
(20.55) 
1995 -13.35
*** 
(3.39) 
-17.19*** 
(6.19) 
-22.88 
(14.99) 
-30.19 
(30.55) 
1996 -11.08
*** 
(3.64) 
-14.66** 
(7.24) 
-4.56 
(15.46) 
-12.91 
(26.59) 
1997 -13.98
*** 
(3.38) 
-17.49** 
(7.13) 
-17.97 
(16.95) 
-26.69 
(35.43) 
1998 -14.17
*** 
(2.90) 
-16.84** 
(7.08) 
-20.42 
(13.22) 
-28.33 
(35.89) 
1999 -15.86
*** 
(3.32) 
-18.15** 
(8.03) 
9.56 
(13.34) 
1.81 
(36.48) 
2000 -12.93
*** 
(2.94) 
-14.85 
(8.77) 
40.33** 
(19.21) 
31.74 
(32.16) 
2001 -13.50
*** 
(3.27) 
-14.85 
(9.68) 
9.08 
(10.97) 
0.96 
(41.10) 
2002 -14.73
*** 
(3.17) 
-15.77 
(9.66) 
28.75 
(15.37) 
20.39 
(43.79) 
Demographic  
Controls? No Yes No Yes 
Health  
Controls? No Yes No Yes 
N 714 714 714 714 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics Annual Natality Detail Files.  
Notes: The dependent variable in each OLS regression is the birthrate for infants 
with Down syndrome in each state and year. All regressions except Columns 1 and 
3 include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
Demographic controls include: (a) average age at childbirth of mother in state s, 
year t; (b) share of women who are white giving birth in state s, year t; (c) share of 
women with some college education or less, at childbirth in state s, year t; and (d) 
share of married women at childbirth in state s, year t. Medical and health controls 
2009] DISABILITY-SELECTIVE ABORTION AND THE ADA 905 
 
include: (a) average live birth order (including the current birth) in state s, year t; 
(b) average number of prenatal visits in state s, year t; and (c) share of live births 
subject to amniocentesis in state s, year t. ** = significance at the 5% level and *** 
= significance at the 1% level. 
 
